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ABSTRACT

This qualitative study provides a semiotic perspective on cyberterrorism and its
opportunity to cause maximal damage while using terrorist propaganda. The very definition of
cyberterrorism refers to Internet use, technology, and computer-based networks against critical
infrastructures. The application of Stamper’s Semiotic Ladder– morphological, empirical,
syntactical, semantic, pragmatic and social world –to the various methods of propaganda utilized
by cyberterrorists will uncover aspects on the transition from traditional to modern methods of
attack, cyberterrorist communication, and the recruitment of new members to their cause.
Additionally, this research focused on the role of the media in the equation of planning by
propaganda to the fruition of an attack. Interviews were collected from ten participants during
30-60 minute segments.
Based on the data, five themes emerged: (1) Acknowledgement of the Existence of
Cyberterrorism, (2) Postmodern Propaganda and Publicity, (3) Detrimental Effects on Targets,
(4) Media Implications , and (5) Communicative Messages. This provides readers with an
organized order to the data and provides a way to progressively detail cyberterrorism, with a
specific focus on the actual effects of their semiotic intents on targets, on the public, and on the
world at large or what is being conveyed. Ultimately, the themes that emerged follow Stamper’s
Semiotic Ladder, starting with surface level understanding of cyberterrorism and work up to the
global impact of cyberterrorism on various aspects of culture, beliefs, and expectations.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

With every passing year, the changes in technology have provided people across the
globe with devices that are smaller and more efficient, electronics that are faster, and networks
that hold more information. The Internet alone has proven to bring connectivity to many areas of
the world through emails, Webcam opportunities, and a network of information available to
anybody, at any given time. With these technological advances growing at such a rapid pace, it
comes as no surprise that the technology that is being used by criminals has also had a
postmodern upgrade, with the intent of causing maximum damage at minimal cost to the
attacker. One such example of destruction has been the distribution of computer viruses, such as
the Macro Virus, Melissa the Bugbear virus, and the MSBlaster worm (West, 1999). As global
communities display more and more dependence on technology to moderate daily activities and
regulate practices carried out by the Internet, the global community becomes increasingly
vulnerable to the negative use of Internet technology: cyberterrorism (Clem, Galwankar, &
Buck, 2003). Cyberterrorism, a method of attack that damages, shuts down, tampers with, or
destroys critical points of national infrastructure by manipulating and controlling computer
networks (Sloan, 2006), poses a serious threat to the world’s leading countries specifically for
the fact that these countries possess economies that are increasingly dependent on technology
and computers (Aldrich, 2000).
This initial definition may seem like a screenwriters’ dream, and while there have been
recent movies, such as Firewall in 2006 (Bernstein, Iwanyk & Loncraine, 2006) and Live Free or
Die Hard in 2007 (Fottrell & Wiseman, 2007), the real life scope of damages featuring
1

cyberterrorism as the predominant weapon of choice is actually ongoing outside of Hollywood.
Cyberterrorism either damages the health of human communities or causes a fear of this harm
(Clem, Galwankar, & Buck, 2003). In addition, the rationale behind cyberterrorism is
predominantly based on motives of an ideological or political nature because cyberterrorists
aspire to gain notoriety for their cause (Jain, 2005). Cyberterrorism is not only technical; it is
also communicative in nature because it aims at sending messages of violence designed to
publicize the attacker’s status of power and legitimacy. One of the motives of cyberterrorism is
the need for publicity and recognition of propaganda. Cyberterrorists accomplish their goals of
power by using propaganda that creates a mindset in which there are clear “us” v “them”
mentalities laid out in such a way so that the “enemy” becomes nothing more than a faceless and
nameless other (Keen, 1991). When this mindset is widely accepted, it is much less complicated
for a criminal to compromise electronic networks, power grids, and other elements of critical
infrastructures with intents that may not be exclusively aimed at creating damage (Schweitzer,
2002). It is also fair to say that in addition to garnering recognition, cyberterrorism aims at
achieving political goals. One of the key components of cyberterrorism is the use of the Internet,
technology, and computer-based networks against critical infrastructures. The Internet
revolutionizes the methods in which cyberterrorists communicate, how new members are
recruited, and how they advertise propaganda for their cause.

Purpose of Study

The main premise of this study is to explore the communicative intents behind attackers
through the use of propaganda and examine how this corresponds to the damage that they cause.
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The purpose of this study is to analyze what steps must be taken by cyberterrorists to cause
severe damage to targets (both nationally and internationally) with minimal involvement on the
cyber attackers’ part. As the literature review will explain, cyberterrorists seek publicity; they
advertise their deeds and messages. Yet, more research needs to be conducted on the actual
effects of their semiotic messages on targets, on the public, and on the world at large. In order to
investigate this, I used the method of qualitative interviewing. The research required that
qualitative methodology be used and data were collected via in-depth conversational (face-toface) interviewing. One of the reasons the methodology was qualitative. Was based on the fact
that a certain number of the participants are highly secure people (e.g., law enforcement agents
and possible FBI agents) who, because of legal constraints, refused to fill out surveys. According
to them, one of the conditions to answer my questions was to see the researcher face-to-face. The
research was driven by four questions of which the essence was captured in the literature review:
Research Question 1: What are the communicative motives being conveyed through
propaganda being utilized by cyberterrorists?
Research Question 2: How do the media play a role in the perpetuation of the
propaganda?
Research Question 3: What aspects of the social world, according to Stamper’s Semiotic
model, are being met?
Research Question 4: How are the aspects of Stamper’s Ladder in regards to the social
world being carried out?
Now that we know what drives this study, it might prove useful to give a preview of the
main points of this thesis. Following a brief explanation of the purpose of the study, a rationale
will be given about the aspects of cyberterrorism and semiotics that have been studied as well as
3

the direction of this thesis that will provide fresh insight into semiotics and cyberterrorism. This
thesis will continue with a description of cyberterrorism that includes the traditional methods of
communication through the Internet, the media that are separate from the computer, past
instances of cyber attacks, and the current status of cyberterrorism. Following the overview of
cyberterrorism are the explanation and application of the different levels of Stamper’s Semiotic
Ladder – morphological, empirical, syntactical, semantic, pragmatic and social behavior – to
cyberterrorism. Next is an analysis of the documented uses of propaganda by cyberterrorism to
date (such as websites, videos, and online forums) that then turn into cyber weapons. A
methodology section details the process of finding participants and the collection and reduction
of data followed by data analysis that will focus on five themes that emerged throughout the
study. Finally, after the data and analysis sections, a discussion of the study including limitations
and directions for further research will be provided.

Rationale for Conducting this Semiotic Analysis

This study addresses, from a semiotic standpoint, the significance associated with
cyberterrorist attacks and provides examples of how these attacks can be analyzed by applying
the theoretical semiotic framework. Thus far, the most up-to-date debate in regards to social
sciences and the application of cyberterrorism is rooted in theoretical approaches of game theory
(i.e., Lye & Wing, 2005), social network analysis (i.e., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001a, 2001b), and
social learning theory (i.e., Jaishankar, 2008). Although semiotic-based models of cyberterrorism
have been analyzed by O’Hair and Heath (2005) and Desouza and Hensgen (2007), what has
been the primary focus in these studies is an emphasis on the “publicity” that conventional
4

terrorists look to use. To be more exact, what has been established by previous scholars is that
cyberterrorists gain publicity for their deeds by evoking fear through strategic images or
messages, virus sending, or by outmuscling specific targets (e.g., defacing websites of foreign
presidents or prime ministers) by defacing their personal websites or sending other attacking
visual symbol.
For purposes of clarification, this researcher fully corroborates with the previously
established sentiment that cyberterrorism is a communicative process (O’Hair & Heath, 2005)
and would like to further note that there is no disagreement with the longstanding belief of the
notion that semiotics is directly connected to the power of symbol and visuals. The semiotic act
that can be seen in the form of symbols, signs, media images, and messages are all pertinent to
the technologically-saturated interests of the modern world (Miller, Matusitz, O’Hair, &
Eckstein, 2008). It is almost obviously apparent those semiotics directly coincide with
cyberterrorism when looking at the propaganda that is utilized. Cyberterrorism is perpetuated
and publicized through new media communication, it is advocated through the Internet, it is
campaigned and recruited for virtually, and this all occurs through public communication
channels. By using and exploiting new media, the motives of cyberterrorism to frighten and
coerce are ultimately accomplished through semiotics. As an additional component, these
messages will be exemplified through instances such as the World Fantabulous Defacers (WFD),
cracking into and defacing the official website of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and
various cyberterrorism acts in another semiotic function: one that communicates political
meaning that conveys more of an ideological statement than a substantial material threat.
With the intent of gaining new insight on the matter of cyberterrorism, this study applies
Stamper’s Semiotic Ladder to the phenomenon of cyber terror. To put it briefly, Stamper’s
5

Semiotic Ladder provides a model of “organizational semiotics,” which expands from the
general semiotic approach as a whole. Organizational semiotics constructs the categorization of
semiotic understanding by displaying the various and escalating degrees of intensity called the
Semiotic Ladder (Stamper, 1996). The construction of this ladder doubles as a depiction of
hierarchy by using various points in the system, coupled with a solid theoretical foundation from
the recognition that all technology (including that of human skills), knowledge, understanding,
and competence must possess some semblance of organization (Filipe, 2000). Stamper’s ladder,
working up from lowest to highest, represents six levels: morphological, empirical, syntactical,
semantic, pragmatic and social world (Hengsen, Desouza, Evaristo, & Kraft 2003; Hengsen,
Desouza, & Kraft, 2003).
Propaganda as a semiotic tool for cyberterrorism is also a heavy focus in this study, with
the media being one of the most prominent ways by which terrorists utilize this propaganda
(Cowen, 2006). Cyberterrorists use the Internet as another medium for propaganda (Hoffman
2003). Present-day terrorists recognize that the media is a way in which they can manipulate the
system, by information gaining as well as spreading awareness and creating the desired images
and feelings about deeds conducted, penetrating the attitudes of the public sphere (Laqueur,
2006).
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Cyberterrorism: Definition

In order to understand the full scope of how destructive and powerful cyberterrorism can
be, it is important to gain a basic understanding of the actual word. The word cyberterrorism
comes from the merging of two words (Conway, 2002): “cyberspace,” meaning the makeup of
data, algorithms, and computer networks, and “terrorism,” which is the premeditated, politically
motivated violence committed against innocent persons or noncombatants (Deutsch, 1997).
Cyberterrorism, at its basic form, is a method of attack designed to damage, tamper with, or
destroy critical points of national infrastructure by controlling and manipulating computer
networks (Sloan, 2006). The prefix “cyber” suggests that this type of terrorism occurs throughout
cyberspace and is, in turn, accessible through computers (Conway, 2002). The basic premise of
traditional terrorism is the threat, or the actual use of violence against people or property, with
the intention of inflicting enough harm to garner attention, create fear, and influence decisionmaking (Sloan, 1981). A different concept than conventional crime, terrorism has roots in strong
ideological motives, often with a goal of imposing principles and beliefs by illegal and violent
means.
Though most instances of cyberterrorism occur with use of the Internet, it is important to
recognize that the lesser utilized mechanisms of the telephone also play a role in conducting
denial-of-service attacks (i.e., D.O.S. attacks), which render computer networks inaccessible,
inoperable, or ineffectual, thus easing the transmission and distribution of propaganda by the
7

attacker (Brown, 2006). One such example of a D.O.S. attack would be a victim who is injured
attempting to get help by dialing 911, only to be met with continuous dropped phone calls or just
a dead line. In causing attacks, a cyberterrorist has access to any given nation vulnerable to
attacks of a grand scale. What this means is that irreparable damage can be caused due to a
nation’s heavy reliance on critical infrastructure that is rooted in computer networks (Lewis,
2002). Using a universal weapon as seemingly harmless as the computer, cyberterrorists have at
their fingertips a medium that allows them to cause great damage with minor consequence
(Gorge, 2007). Files can be stolen and corrupted, computer viruses can be spread and these are
all due to the easy access provided by the Internet. There is a multiplied threat in some cases,
when the attacker is a former employee, familiar with the computer network, and wishing to
cause harm (Misra, 2005). The destruction of websites, knowingly crashing selected networks,
causing denial of service in crisis situations, spreading malicious computer viruses, causing
physical destruction and tampering with financial interactions, all while inducing panic and
causing psychological harm to targets, are all utilized methods commonly known as information
warfare (Paul, 2008).
This form of attack holds greater appeal than that of the conventional methods used in the
past for many reasons. For example, the costs of such an attack greatly diminish when, all things
considered, the equipment needed for such an attack does not go beyond that of a computer and
an online connection rather that the traditional weapons of guns or bombs used in terror
situations of the past (Weimann, 2005). Previous examples of traditional terrorist attacks that
were carried out in real time, required massive amounts of organized locations in which attackers
utilized software such as robotic networks that globally hijack any number of targets and render
them helpless (Aaviksoo, 2008). It is precisely this lack of physical presence in regards to a
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target that provides a foundation for the rationale behind why cyberterrorism is a preferred
method. There is a level of anonymity that comes with a lack of borders, barriers, and authority
that leaves an attacker virtually without consequence to target anyone or anything across the
globe (Weimann, 2005). This notion reflects the idea that crimes committed via computers are of
a global nature in which unleashing worms and viruses that steal information is not limited on a
small scale, but can occur between entire countries and nations when attackers are given free rein
to commit crimes internationally, against individuals, corporations, and governments (Cassell,
2006). Western infrastructures have been a popular target; so have highly populated areas, both
domestic and foreign, which will remain primary venues that become susceptible to attacks
(Gunaratna, 2005). Combined with the notion that cyberterrorism is both inexpensive and
anonymous, as well as remote, an attacker is not forced into physically demanding high risk
situations; nor do they have to be as crafty to outwit security systems (Weimann, 2005).
The rationale for the occurrence of cyberterrorism has symbolically included that of
political motivation (Baudrillard, 2002). When emblematic western infrastructures such as
banks, hotels, and utilities are considered, the sheer volume of targets becomes endless, causing
the focus for an attacker to switch to a symbolic or strategic nature, where the motivation for an
attack is fueled by the amount of damage that can be done (Gunaratna, 2005). An appealing
factor in the equation of cyberterrorism is that the attacks are conducted from a location removed
from the target (Weimann, 2005). An attacker can handpick a target based on vulnerability in
various areas of government, health, commerce, and utilities (Brown, 2006). Examples that fall
under the assertion of causing damage from a remote location could be that of an attacker
opening a dam and releasing flood waters, causing a nuclear power plant meltdown, or causing
an oil pipeline to burst (Brownlie, 1963). Because these utilities are run on complex computer
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systems, there is a vulnerability that is easy for an attacker to penetrate and exploit (Weimann,
2005). For this reason, the shift from traditional methods of attack to the more modern form of
cyberterrorism is appealing because physical demands are diminished, the risk of death
decreases, and the amount of time contributed by an attacker has less of a psychological effect.
This, in turn, eases the burden for terror organizations to maintain the number of members
dedicated to the cause (Weimann, 2005). Lastly, and most importantly, there is a media
motivational aspect for attackers (Weimann, 2005). As a concrete example of the motivation
derived from media attention, in cases such as the I LOVE YOU virus, a virus that caused an
estimated $10 billion in damages on 350,000 computers in over 20 different countries (Deal,
Gage, & Schueneman, 2001), the media coverage garnered from that incident was larger in
volume than could be expected had the incident occurred in one place (Subramanya &
Lakshminarasimhan, 2001). When each incident is covered with such depth by the media, an
inflated sense of importance and meaning is attributed to each attack.
Now that there is a foundation for understanding exactly what cyberterrorism is and the
scope it encompasses, a focus on the communicative aspect is warranted. It is not enough to
know that these attacks are occurring. One must seek to uncover not only the method of
communication, but the meaning behind the communication as well. One note to mention when
attempting to analyze the “intent” of another is the very concept of “intent.” When talking about
motives, one must keep in mind that such a concept is intangible and as such will be
immeasurable. As a researcher who cannot be certain of the exact motive behind the actions of
an individual, one must look at overall behavior to tease out patterns and analyze the symbolic
meaning behind those actions. In doing so, an understanding of semiotics is needed in order to
place symbolic meaning in context.
10

Semiotics: A Description

Though it is important to note that any attack can leave irreparable damage, it is the
significance behind the attacks that this thesis proposal seeks to address and why an attack can be
attributed so much importance. Semiotics is the study of signs and symbols, providing
explanations for how meaning is constructed and understood (Eco, 1976). Charles Sanders
Pierce, the originator of the concept of semiotics, constructed a basis for understanding, allowing
semiotics to make sense of signs, understand their meanings and associations, and process their
evolution (Hensgen et al., 2003a). Pierce suggests that words, objects and actions are symbols in
life that have meaning because they relate to how the symbols are organized into larger patterns
that help understand how the world works, who we are as people, what is important to us and
how to act in life (Littlejohn & Foss, 2008). Semiotics provides a basis for the research and
analysis of the inner workings of any given organization’s culture, systems, and common themes,
taking what could be interpreted as mundane or meaningless and approaching it critically,
providing an insight to hidden aspects of that culture (Barley, 1983). The meaning-making
behind semiotics allows for interpretation to be taken from many forms including that of text and
displays from media (Chandler, 2002). The broadest interpretation of places where meaning can
be derived has roots in verbal and nonverbal contexts as well as messages that are independent
from the source or the recipient due to the nature of the message being recorded. This includes
that of video and audio recording, as well as that which had been written (Chandler, 2002).
Semiotics can also help to uncover the constructed truth and values of a particular culture or
organization, regardless of exactly how much is accurate truth outside of the members of that
11

culture or organization (Kress, 1993). Especially when the idea of modality enters the equation,
the boundaries of reality for a certain group may exceed the boundaries recognized outside the
specific group in question (Chandler, 2002). When talking about reality, Kress and van Leeuwen
(2001) recognize that,
a social semiotic theory of truth cannot claim to establish the absolute truth or untruth of
representations. It can only show whether a given “proposition” (visual, verbal or
otherwise) is represented as true or not. From the point of view of social semiotics, truth
is a construct of semiosis, and as such the truth of a particular social group, arising from
the values and beliefs of that group (p. 159).
Organizational semiotics, a subsection of semiotics as a whole, has led scholars to
categorizing semiotic understanding into varying degrees of intensity called the Semiotic Ladder
(Stamper, 1996). The reason for this hierarchy and categorization of various points in the system
generates roots from the recognition that all technology (including that of human skills),
knowledge, and competence need to have some semblance of organization (Filipe, 2000). The
ladder, starting from lowest level and working up, represents six different levels: morphological
(also called physical world), empirical, syntactical, semantic, pragmatic and lastly social
behavior (Stamper, 1996). Morphological, which is the most elementary of the phases, is rooted
in physical objects and is regulated to observing individual occurrences in which each object is
scrutinized and considered to have been carried out in isolation (Ramaprasad & Rai, 1996). The
morphological level is one that can be identified with by recognizing components such as
“signals, traces, physical distinctions, hardware, component density, speed and economics”
(Stamper, 1996, p. 351). Following the morphological level is the empirical level which is
comprised of the understanding that things are observable and that groups exhibit similar
12

characteristics and a summary is reached that categorizes various elements of behavior within
groups (Desouza, 2002). Recognizable characteristics at this level fall in the identification of
“pattern, variety, noise, entropy, channel capacity, redundancy, efficiency and code” (Stamper,
1996, p. 351). Following the empirical level is the syntactical level which offers a multifaceted
arrangement of information by incorporating and connecting objects and agents from the
previous two levels to form a new level of understanding and functioning within the organization
(Desouza, Chattaraj, & Kraft, 2003). It is at this phase that behavioral patterns are established
that will aid in prediction (Polderman & Willems, 1998), inner group norms are constructed
(Tricker, 1992), and historical contexts necessary to understand the foundation for which the
relationships in that community are built (MacIntyre, 1984). What is being valued in the
syntactical level are formal structure, language, logic, data, records, deduction, software and
files” (Stamper, 1996, p. 351). An important distinction to make in regard to the six levels is that
the first three levels deal primarily in information systems technology with the remaining levels
merging the information technology (IT) platform with human information functions. Separately,
these levels have no meaning but combined, they offer a fuller semiotic framework that will aid
in the recognition and understanding of signs (Stamper, 1996).
The fourth level following the syntactic level is the semantic level, in which a reality can
be fashioned because boundaries are built that establish relationships within a system (Hensgen
et al., 2003a). This expands the network to a broader range so that there are no restrictions on
any one environment, entity or organization, but an all encompassing focus reaching units on a
global and transnational level (Baraldi, 2006). This level encompasses “meanings, propositions,
validity, truth, signification and denotation” (Stamper, 1996, p. 351). The fifth level, pragmatics,
builds upon the previous levels in that there is now a dialogue or communication that breaches
13

the intrapersonal level and meaning is now being formed synergistically. This can be seen
through various expressions of “intentions, communications, conversations and negotiations”
(Stamper, 1996, p. 351). The final level, the social world, is the culmination of all the other
levels working together in action and in turn, affecting those not affiliated with the group to take
some sort of action (Hensgen et al., 2003a). These attributes are represented as “beliefs,
expectations, commitments, contracts, law and culture” (Stamper, 1996, p. 351). As such, the
application of semiotics plays a vital role in understanding how the publicity and propaganda of
cyberterrorists are made so effective, respectively, as threats (Skoll, 2007). Because
cyberterrorism is a system, the purpose of a semiotic approach is so that an understanding of that
system can be formed and consequently analyzed (Hensgen et al., 2003a). By focusing a
spotlight on the practices of terrorists and how modern technology has allowed for modern
approaches to attacks, the meaning behind the methods, be it media influence, political drive or
malicious intent can be uncovered and analyzed.

Application of Semiotics to Cyberterrorism

Pierce (1955) analyzed in detail the various components needed in defining what consists
of a sign: a physical representation, something to which the physical representation alludes and
somebody with the ability to interpret the relationship. The various phases of Stamper’s Semiotic
Ladder do exactly that and can be applied to the different instances of cyberterrorism ranging
from malicious to extremely harmful. There are many different uses of the Internet that
cyberterrorists manipulate to achieve the goals they set out. One study, analyzing cyberterrorist
organizations and their supporters found that there were thousands of websites run by these
14

attackers that ranged from exploiting a variety of the unregulated, anonymous, and easily
accessible areas on the Internet to communicating different threatening messages to a variety of
audiences (Weimann, 2006). Weimann identifies a number of different methods utilizing the
Internet with results ranging from psychological warfare to recruitment, networking to other
attackers and for the promotion of fundraising (2006). The application of Stamper’s Semiotic
Ladder takes the various results that have been achieved and tracks the significance behind each
choice made by the attackers. It is vital to keep in mind that in the application of semiotics to
cyberterrorism, that with each level, another set of meaning emerges in a “from-the-ground-up”
process as opposed to a top down arrangement typically associated with traditional patterns of
organizational hierarchy (Hensgen et al., 2003a).
To start, the morphological or physical level of semiotics models the signals (events) and
marks (objects) as well as the routes and destinations of transmission occurring on a basic and
individual level (Stamper, 1996). The restriction of individual attacks carried out by one person
can be seen in instances where attackers hope to achieve a self-fulfilling goal. One such example
occurred in 2002, when a disgruntled employee, after being fired from a government job, used an
Internet connection to release a million gallons of raw sewage along the coast of Queensland
Sunshine (Weimann, 2005). E-crimes also fall into the category of morphological as well. Nearly
$8 million dollars was stolen from Cisco Systems by two accountants who used the company’s
computer systems as a means of siphoning funds from company stock (Tedeschi, 2003). One last
example of the isolated incidents occurring for self-fulfilling purposes happened in 1992, a
discontented employee of Chevron Corporation’s emergency alert network penetrated computer
networks in New York and San Jose, California and compromised the firm’s emergency alert
system, setting it up for failure during a crisis (Denning, 1999).
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On the empirical level, what have emerged are a dozen or so different occurrences of the
events and objects, allowing for the tracking of the physical components of signs that have
already been witnessed (Stamper, 1996). At this level, the ability to recognize a group based on
characteristics of attacks, and cells (much like criminal profiling) can start to take shape,
allowing for continuous tracking of patterns to occur. Specifically, recording examples of denial
of service attacks, and grouping Internet Protocol (I.P.) addresses whose signals emitted similar
patterns within close times of each other, aid in monitoring and predicting patterns of misuse in a
uniform manner over a period of time (Hensgen et al., 2003a). IPs, for example, have common
identifiable features that can be documented and tracked. At this level, along with propaganda
and a network of communication, cyberterrorism could also include an organized set of attacks
with financial purposes to fund subsequent terrorist efforts that aid in the ultimate goal of the
organization (Wynne, 2002).
At the third level, syntactical, interdependency has formed so that the parts of the
organization are working together and the strength of the mission depends on the strength of the
relationships formed between agents of the organization (Lui, 2000). Combined with the
synergistic work ethic, meaning is also being established that plays off the meaning of another
entity specific to the group (Stamper, 1996). At this level, something critical can be achieved in
regard to preventative measure. Up until this point, according to the levels, what can be traced at
the morphological level are random, one-time offenses, typically conducted by individuals
hoping to achieve something inherent to the self. At the empirical level, what is being seen is the
emergence of patterns, but nothing definitively concrete in measures of prevention. The
syntactical level displays formal structure and with this structure materializes recorded patterns
displaying some logic. This interdependency of meaning at the syntactic level can be compared
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to a domino effect, suggesting that if one aspect malfunctions, subsequent chaos will affect the
remaining aspects of the system. In 2002, the World Fantabulous Defacers (WFD), a known
cyberterrorist organization hacked into the website of Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister at
the time, and defaced it. The following message was left on the website: “The Face of the
World’s Biggest Murderer.” At the bottom, following the message, a calling card of the group
was left. This example, the WFD’s hacking into Sharon’s official website, is an example in
which deeds conducted by a cyberterrorist group could have escalated into a national Israeli
crisis (Verton, 2003). In 2005, a CNN television news bulletin warned viewers that a new virus
called Zotob was infecting computers, causing them to slow down considerably or reboot
continuously at the network’s New York and Atlanta offices (McKenna, 2005). Shortly after,
computers of companies spanning the nation were infected with the virus (Cassell, 2006). In
addition to that, Zotob acted as a gateway for other malicious software to be installed allowing
for sensitive information such as credit-card numbers and social security numbers to be stolen
(Schneier, 2005). When the dust had settled, Zotob hit approximately 100,000 companies
(Kontzer, 2005). At this level, what can be done, in regards to countermeasures, is the definition
of relationships and assessment of correct linkages between these relationships. Though this is a
small step, it may be one that is crucial to prevent larger and more dangerous cyber attacks
(Desouza & Hensgen, 2003).
The syntactic level dealt mainly in the information level of systems and did not directly
constitute connection with human function and knowledge. The semantic level, and first in
human information function, is indicative of finding meaning in real world instances by mapping
out specific occurrences in a system rather than mapping individual cases (Stamper, 1996).
Often, in regards to cyberterrorism, this level is comprised of knowledge that only an in-group
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member would understand, as in the case of a cyberterrorist organization, knowing all the inner
workings of their system. At this stage, certain dialogue has formed so that an infrastructure can
be created; information exchanged and dialogue between social networks made meaningful
(Laru & Järvelä, 2008). The extent of these organizations can be likened to a full blown
subculture, existing abstractly in time in which only the members of the in-group understand the
dialogue being spoken and only members of the in-group can function in the organization
(Rheingold, 1993). It is at this point that the extension of cyberterrorist targets reaches beyond
the scope of local or national community and even extends to the global community. Attacks at
this level are primarily directed toward large scale targets with the intent of causing maximum
harm, damage, and destruction (Desouza & Hensgen, 2003). One such example is that of
Diab10, which occurred in 2006 when an overseer for the FBI’s Cyber Action Teams received
information from one of the field bases in Seattle, linking him to an email account in Washington
(Schneier, 2005). The FBI team received emails from suspects with an alias “Coder” that
indicated the emails were coming from Turkey and Morocco, respectively. Only after media
coverage of the virus did the suspects express caution, discussing whether they should get rid of
the evidence, by crashing or ditching the hard drives on their computers (Cassell, 2006).
Another example at the syntactical level is that of the FBI announcing the arrest of at
least 16 individuals spanning countries such as the United States, Poland, and Romania. The
criminals were involved in a credit-card theft scam, forcing the FBI to leave agents in the
international countries with the intent of surveillance and information gaining (Cassell, 2006).
Another example occurred following attacks on The World Trade Centers. Mount Sinai NYU
Health System was the target of cyberterrorism in that the data center that handled clinical and
business operations was infiltrated for three of the five hospitals that are part of its system,
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including NYU Downtown Hospital, three blocks from the World Trade Center, losing data and
damaging patient files that stored medical and health insurance records (Haugh, 2003). In March
1997, a cyberterrorist infiltrated a telephone company computer that provided service to the
Worcester Airport in Massachusetts, disrupting service to the airport control tower, causing a
chain reaction among the fire department, security services, and weather service for six hours
(Smith, Grabosky, & Urbas, 2004). The primary goal here is to exploit any weakness in a system
with the intention of causing a domino effect throughout the rest of the network.
The second to last level of semiotics as it applies to cyberterrorism is that of pragmatics,
where the focus is on communication, negotiation and intentions. The “no holds barred”
approach at this level is one with rapid mobility in the cyberterrorist organization. This requires
planning to the degree that the attacker has chosen a specific target (government or business)
with a specific motive (political or non political) and an objective which can range from a minor
nuisance to a grand scale, destructive, life-threatening attack (Mathieu, 2007). Massive amounts
of preparation in the form of information gathering, detailing plans of attack, performing tests,
communication throughout cyberterrorist network, hacking into databases and computer systems,
spreading viruses, and attacking individual businesses are put into play in the pragmatics phase
(Hensgen et al., 2003a). Another example of the pragmatic level would be websites such as
www.alneda.com (Hensgen et al., 2003a) or www.azzam.com (Weimann, 2005) that carry
planning messages to and from terrorist leaders (Iqbal, 2002). Likewise, personal websites,
sometimes more or less politically motivated, but never implemented on a national level all the
way through the attack and then assessment of attacks, are also attributed to the pragmatics phase
(Mathieu, 2007). The Estonian government encountered this type of cyber attack, whereby, in
early 2008, according to specialists at the U.S. Government Accountability Office, hackers
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gained access to the electronic control systems of the nation’s electric power grid, shutting it
down and causing damage (Aaviksoo, 2008).
Lastly, in the levels of semiotics is the application of cyberterrorism to the social world.
Thus far, what has been assessed are the implications of how the information systems, merged
with human functions, aid cyberterrorists in planning attacks on their targets. The formation of
the in-groups beliefs, expectations, and laws that emerge (and the culture that is created) are all
critical aspects have relevancy to the motivations behind these attacks. It has been inferred that
the signs that are displayed are directly correlated to the creation of tokens that are significant to
the creation, sustainment and alteration of the (in-groups) social world. It has been argued that
signs are commonly, and often subconsciously, recognized to be satisfactory indicators, of
symbolic images and moods (Lasswell, 1971). These signs and meanings are thus far unknown
and it is the intent of the researcher to work toward uncovering what the communicative
messages are.

Uses of Propaganda

Verton (2003) explains that,
al Qaeda cells now operate with the assistance of large databases containing details of
potential targets in the U.S. They use the Internet to collect intelligence on those targets,
especially critical economic nodes, and modern software enables them to study structural
weaknesses in facilities as well as predict the cascading failure effect of attacking certain
systems (p. 109)
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This approach is considered postmodern, where the premise is that communication is
directionless and leadership is not needed, nor does it exist (Matusitz, 2008a, 2008b). The
Internet serves as the perfect medium for the trajectory of the modern terrorist: the cyberterrorist.
While the tool (the Internet) has been indentified, previous research by Conway (2002) and
Weimann (2006) shows that primary means of communication, intentional or otherwise, between
cyberterrorist and their targets happen through a variety of employed propaganda. Jowell and
O’Donnell (2006) state that “propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape
perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the
desired intent of the propagandist” (p. 7). Throughout the vast history of war, there have been
many documented cases in which propaganda has been used as exactly this type of catalyst,
igniting motivation during wartime to increase membership in the armed forces (Lasswell, 1971),
as a means of trickery (Krippendorff & Bock, 2008), as a way to or to gain a tactical advantage
against the enemy (George, 1959), or most importantly, as a way to dehumanize the enemy by
creating a realm of “the other” (Keen, 1991). This notion of “the other” is a method in which
negative messages become continuously perpetuated, feeding into the Stamper’s (1996)
explanation of the social world phase. At this level, the formation of in-groups occurs, which
allows for beliefs and expectations to form and laws to emerge that dictate how the enemy is
portrayed. Once these perceptions of an enemy form, they add motivation behind an attack
(Keen, 1991). When there is talk about “the other,” entire cultures become faceless, nameless,
feeling-less entities that are the target of violence and hate (Keen, 1991). The language used in
World War II propaganda consisted of “us” versus “them” mentality messages with terms such
as “Commie bear,” “Nazi Swine,” and “Dog of Capitalism” (Keen, 1991, p. 86), all of which
dehumanize a given target. Because the use of propaganda is so powerful, it is important to
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understand how these various types of propaganda are effective, exactly what types are available
for use, and what is the driving force behind that power.
In regards to the question of power, Keen (1991) suggests that propagandist messages
carry with them certain influential indicators that affect the subconscious psyche of a culture (p.
56). To begin, it is essential to recognize the media as a strong and prominent outlet for terrorists
to communicate propaganda (Cowen, 2006). Another prominent medium in which propaganda is
used as a means of communication is through the Internet (Hoffman 2003). A traditional method
of terrorist communication previously employed was the use of video as a quick and effective
method of relaying terrorist messages. In addition to the main focus of the use of video being a
cheap and easy means of distributing propaganda for their cause, a more aggressive and
destructive utilization of propaganda using the computer and Internet is through virus spreading
(Weimann, 2006). In the first half of 2005, documented worldwide cyber attacks from viruses
reached a recorded 237, a 50 percent increase from the same time period, one year earlier
(Hoopes, 2005).
Propaganda that follows the traditional model instructs an attacker to spend time
effectively gathering intelligence on specific targets as a way to ensure that the maximum
amount of damage that could possibly occur actually comes to fruition in each incident (Mathieu,
2007). Certain tactics that are put into place start with extensive target analysis, intelligence
gathering, and a network of command and control are considered necessities when attacking a
target, all of which are designed to utilize many different directions to assault a target (Desouza
& Hensgen, 2003). To continue outlining the merging of traditional method of attack joining a
modern view occurs when cyberterrorism facilitators pinpoint targets through the use of
computers, by way of propaganda, recruitment, collection of data and information gathering, and
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member-to-member communication through forums and videos via the Internet (Weimann,
2006). An even more in-depth scope of these computer-based activities includes message
posting, launching campaigns of a psychological nature, gathering information on potential
targets, allowing for the synchronization of agendas and actions, allotting funds to specific areas,
and using videos to conduct virtual terror training (Tzfati &Weimann, 2002).
Continuing on with the understanding of the role of the media in current terrorist
operations, it has been recognized that the media can manipulate and form desired images in
respect to the minds of the public (Laqueur, 1996). The example of the I LOVE YOU virus was a
prime opportunity for media coverage on a massive scale, which only succeeds in fueling
terrorist organizations and providing motivation for continued attacks. Publicity and media are
considered a necessity in the world of cyberterrorism, outlining two of the primary themes in the
motivation of the attackers. Jenkins (1975) proposes that,
propaganda terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of
the electronic media and the international press. Taking and holding hostages increases
the drama. The hostages themselves often mean nothing to the terrorists. Terrorism is
aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims. Terrorism is a theater (p. 4).
With the suggestion of the motives of terrorism rooted in theatrics, it is akin to suggesting that to
be recognized in a highly visible and memorable way is the purpose for the attack; qualities often
attributed to media coverage (Cowen, 2006). What is meant by “terrorism as theater” is not an
exclusive activity reserved only for a select group, rather a particular and precise display
intended for an audience from one end of the spectrum to the other; much like a sporting event or
a performance (Cowen, 2006). These “theatrical” qualities – lack of regulation, easy access, vast
range of audiences, and rapid information transfer – have allowed the goals of terrorists to be
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achieved, an increasingly attractive option when terror via the Internet allows for easy causing of
damage with decreased fear of getting caught (Rogers, 2003). Terrorist messages such as these
are clearly heard worldwide due to well developed and well dispersed media contacts (Kim,
Scheufele, & Shanahan, 2002).
Similarly, Internet sites produce numerous opportunities for in-group communication and
publicity, documenting a trend that encapsulates cause for organizations (Arquilla & Ronfeldt,
2001). The State Department generated a list of terrorist organizations that confirmed that at least
half of the known listed organizations have websites that are used for the solicitation of money
and membership as well as a way for coded messages to make its way among group members
(Gordon & Ford, 2002). Internet provides the luxury of non-physical contact with another
member of the group where new recruits can become affiliated and commit to carrying out
terrorist attacks, never actually leaving the comfort of home. In short, the use of propaganda has
become the standard norm among terror groups (Harmon, 2001). Terrorist organizations require
backing from supporters in the areas of both recruiting for membership and funding in order to
continue to operate. Another use for propaganda is to discredit enemies (in the form of creating
“the other”) all while placing the organizations in a positive light. Traditional propaganda
techniques such as leaflets and publications in newspapers have now been replaced by the use of
websites for financial backing and membership recruiting (Wright, 1991). These leaflets and
newspapers are truly an artifact of the past with the United States Department of State reported
as early as 1999, that over one-third of the known Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTOs) had
their own website (McGirk, 1999).
Popular radical groups of international significance such as Lebanese-based Shi’ite
Islamic group, Hezbollah (Conway, 2002), operate Internet sites and use this outlet for various
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purposes such posting articles or agendas of upcoming events, or to publish recently filmed
videos, which can be accessed by anybody in the global cyber community (Deutsch, 1996).
Cyberterrorist organizations also feature disappearing and reappearing message boards and
websites (Weimann, 2006). One attacker, playing cat-and-mouse games with authorities through
his websites, known as Irhabi007, emerged over the Internet as a leader of an online terrorist
organization. His antics included online videos with instructions for home-made car bombs and
he also led forums criticizing American foreign policy, only to take them down and repost or list
them under a different domain name (Fulghum, 2005). In November of 2005, as a tribute to a
suicide bomber involved in the attacks on London, a full length propaganda video entitled the
martyrdom will of Mohammad Sidique Khan, was posted by another terrorist group known as
Sahaab (Kohlmann 2006) launched on the now-unresponsive website, www.as-sahaab.com. The
video bore unassailable similarities to Irhabi007’s fundamental Islamist message board that had
recently disappeared prior to the attack (Kohlmann, 2006). Copycat websites playing the same
cat-and-mouse games began to spring up after Irhabi007’s capture in 2005, with messages such
as the following: “The enemies of Allah will continuously [try to close down] our website.... We
ask you to register for our mailing list so that you continue to receive the latest news of the
Islamic Army in Iraq.” This post urged followers to continue their membership with the
organization, despite seemingly inoperable websites (Kholmann, 2006).
Ultimately causing violent methods of destruction, Internet messages communicated
between terrorist groups display consistent themes ranging from hate to anger (Talbot, 2005).
Attackers need a starting place. In order to inflict the most damage possible, an attacker needs to
research various potential for damage in the process of building a target profile (Mathieu, 2007).
In order to utilize the Internet to its fullest extent, cyberterrorists can access a multitude of
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international areas and databases that contain sensitive information, such as libraries. Starting
with access to legally obtained information, through legitimate search engines such as Google,
attackers can gather information in the form of maps, satellite images, uploaded pictures and
videos and other texts available in seemingly harmless and innocent ways available in a public
domain (Paul, 2008). Browsing the Internet to gain information allows attackers to start building
profiles against targets using simple resources that are also very much legal. Once the
information gathering process on a target has been completed and is recorded, an attacker can
then use the Internet as a channel for carrying out the attack. The Internet, by way of computers,
is the main tool available for assailants to coordinate and communicate on the method of attack
(Paul, 2008). Encryption programs can be implemented to cover any harmful wrongdoing that
could potentially be exposed throughout the course of the operation and, as this is being done, a
system of hidden messages can be put into place (Paul, 2008). Many of these messages range
content-wise going so far to include instructions, step-by-step illustrated renderings of how an
attack should be carried out, and detailed communicated plans enclosed in a secure network that
requires a designated password to access. U.S. Military computers have shown evidence of being
a popular and frequent target by attackers. In 1998, cyberterrorists, cracked into computers used
by the Pentagon, using these methods of attack, and downloaded technical materials sensitive in
nature (Lenzner & Vardi, 2007). After a federal investigation, the source of the attacks proved to
be a Moscow based series of dial-up connections. The investigation, dubbed Moonlight Maze,
was ineffective in catching the attackers.
The success of the terrorist group is directly correlated with keeping membership levels
at a maximum, and as such, multiple methods of recruiting new members is a major focal point
in the propaganda based messages that are employed (Liu, 2000). In past efforts to increase
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membership among groups, traditional methods of recruitment, such as published written work,
audio-video tapes, CDs, and even local prayer leaders have been employed as a means of
promoting the cause (Paul, 2008). The Internet, an updated and modern element of global
terrorism, is emerging with websites and electronic forums that are used to spread ideological
messages and provide hyperlinks between current operatives in cyberspace in addition to sharing
graphic images depicting previous successes as a call to action for potential new members
(Cronin, 2006). In some instances, donations from sponsors or patrons are requested for those
who wish to be supportive without being directly involved (Cronin, 2006). The content of the
websites offer up a lesson on the history of the organization, and the cause the organization
supports with the intent of enticing new members to join (Paul, 2008). These websites also
provide a venue for cyberterrorists to plan attacks by using a variety of methods that could not be
achieved through other means.
The use of video provides another powerful arena utilized by terrorist. Video has been a
vital part in the process of propaganda that is cheap and globally accessible (Weimann, 2006).
Films depicting anything from the morale-boosting success of radical fighters to the more
macabre and disconcerting videos of executions, ambushes, and roadside bombings have
emerged at a steady and continuous pace, being systematically distributed across the world
(Kholmann, 2006). Terrorist group Zarqawi’s media chief, Abu Mayasara, displays the power of
online videos when he posted, in a forum, an online insurgent video of high ranking members of
Zarqawi’s organization beheading American businessman Nicholas Berg (Glasser & Coll, 2005).
Mere weeks after that video was posted, additional copycat beheading videos trying to achieve
the same gruesome effect as Zarqawi’s conquest, and dozens of new unidentified Arabic-
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language message boards, appeared rapidly on radical Islamist websites across the Internet
(Kholamann, 2006).
The main difference in film distribution, to compare past methods to present day, is that
in previous years, the videos, produced and distributed in traceable brick-and-mortar
establishments allowed for easy identification and easy prosecution of offenders, whereas
present-day operations are postmodern and join Internet access with software designed for video
editing and virtually untraceable upload capabilities (Kholmann, 2006).
In addition to easy access and virtual inability to be traced back to any one criminal, an
appeal for the use of propaganda lies heavily in the ability to induce fear on a grand scale,
affecting mass amounts of people. Participants who were exposed to clips of terrorism and
threats to national security developed higher anxiety than those who were not exposed to such
clips, according to one study (Slone, 2000). Perfidy or betrayal is an applicable outcome to the
use of videos that rely on deceitful methods because there is a reliance on outcomes that are
psychologically damaging, allowing for a tactical advantage to be achieved (Dinstein, 2004).
Damaging and deceitful perfidy could be explained in a more detailed manner in regard
to video, when the false construction or the blatant alteration of images or recordings occurs
specifically to make a false claim against a party (Army Field Manual, 1956). By extension,
videos communicate a message to members of an organization and are used for purposes of
displaying examples of previous successful attacks on a grand scale. Another example of the
deceitful nature in the form of damaging messages communicated through video comes to light
when a multitude of videos are altered to express meaning that had not been originally intended
(Slone, 2000). Documented cases have exhibited modified and forged footage, such as falsely
spliced voice recordings that depict an enemy head of state issuing orders for war crimes, or
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digitally altered state uniforms that have been changed to resemble enemy attire (Shulman,
1999). Tactics such as these create consequences that are short-term and steeped in deceit of a
political nature. The consequences that occur long-term – that of increased fatalities, extended
periods of war, and schisms in the restoration of peace – destroy any foundation of peace that
have been gained previously (Army Field Manual, 1956). Additionally, propaganda allows for
the perpetuation of “the other,” continuing the mindset of damaging nationalistic pride which “is
the language of blood: a call to arms which can end in the horrors of ethnic cleansing” (Billig,
1995, p.48).
Thus far, there is evidence to suggest that through means of technology – video, internet,
and media coverage – messages through propaganda are worthy of mention because of the
implications they carry from a communicative perspective. It has been suggested that restricted
media coverage of terrorist attacks would in turn decrease the amount of terrorist attacks that
occur afterward because a primary communicative intent- media coverage and recognition- was
not being met (Cowen, 2006). If this is the case, an interesting perspective to look for in the data
would be the ties that connect the media, propaganda and the communicative messages that are
being conveyed.
What the literature thus far has demonstrated is that, through semiotic gestures and the
use of similar symbolic systems, cyberterrorists are capable of communicating their intents. It
has been noted, as represented in the semantic and pragmatic phases of semiotics, that the intent
is to utilize any output necessary to play upon the fears to the public and by association,
enhancing the power cyberterrorists wield. More specifically, this output is represented in
coverage by the media generating increased attention and heightening the theatrical element
behind each attack. Also demonstrated is a carefully crafted network of Internet savvy members
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of cyberterrorist organizations who communicate power and status through online video clips,
websites and through methods of destruction ranging from the malicious (denial of service), to
the irreparably devastating (death). The motives of cyberterrorists are the same as those of
conventional terrorists: to send images of fear. In the same way that terrorism is, first and
foremost, a process of communication between terrorists and target audiences (Tuman, 2003), a
key objective of cyberterrorists is to send a powerful signal, whose meaning is intended to
frighten and coerce. Cyberterrorism is a semiotic act; be it a message, a symbol, or an image on a
website. Our computer-based universe is wrapped up with images, signs, and symbols. Truly,
there is a powerful semiotic dimension to cyberterrorism.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

The third section of this thesis covers the methods used to conduct the study. Before I
describe, in detail, what the methods of research entail, it might prove useful to remind readers of
the research questions:
Research Question 1: What are the communicative motives being conveyed through
propaganda being utilized by cyberterrorists?
Research Question 2: How do the media play a role in the perpetuation of the
propaganda?
Research Question 3: What aspects of the social world, according to Stamper’s Semiotic
model, are being met?
Research Question 4: How are the aspects of Stamper’s Ladder in regards to the social
world being carried out?

Why Qualitative Research?

One of the reasons the methodology is qualitative lies in the fact that some of the
participants were highly secure people who, by U.S. Federal Law, were not allowed fill out
surveys. In order to answer my question and give me data, they needed to see me, the researcher,
face to face (in a one-on-one interview). To recruit participants working for law enforcement and
other federal agencies, I used chaining. Chaining is a process whereby one person tries to get
another person entrée into a group or community that is usually not open to the public. In the
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world of law enforcement (L.E.) and other federal agencies, there is a two-degree separation. I
attempted, with success, to get interviews with L.E. agents using this process of chaining, that is,
through an informant who can be trusted by L.E. agents.
In line with these contentions, what occurred through this process were a few cases in
which the participants were not totally familiar with the way cyberterrorist strategies work or
what their intents are. Nevertheless, with chaining, this scarcity of knowledge was overcome
because the interview protocol allowed for an initial general discussion that determined the
overall participant’s knowledge of the subject. In a similar vein, I spent some time with each
participant creating an informational foundation before the interview continued. I asked the
participants broad, experiential queries as conversational grounds for the participant to volunteer
their accounts or narratives of their experience or encounter with cyber attacks. However, with a
quantitative instrument like a questionnaire (Reinard, 2001), it would be more difficult to follow
the procedure described here.

Kvale’s Procedures

This section will provide a detailed account of the rationale behind the structure of the
interview protocol and why using observing Kvale’s (1996) procedures produced positive
outcomes. The research employed qualitative methodology and data were collected via in-depth
conversational (face-to-face) interviewing, following the procedures given by Kvale (1996).
Kvale (1996) calls for seven stages in the interview process: thematizing, designing,
interviewing, transcribing, analyzing, verifying, and reporting. As shown in the appendix, the
interview protocol is based on questions about cyberterrorists, their communicative messages,
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styles of propaganda, as well as various strategies they use on a daily basis. All this constitutes a
semiotic gesture. The interview protocol was designed in such a way that I, the researcher,
allowed for the possibility that the interviewees’ responses would add fresh insights. The
principles of interview set forth by Kvale (1996) suggest that questions asked in interview format
are done so with professionalism in mind as opposed to the easy dialogue displayed in everyday
conversation. Keeping this in mind, the questions for the interview were created in a way that
provided a softened facade of a structured interview schedule, while still attempting to get the
feel of an everyday conversation. To add to this, the questions were asked in a way that built
upon initial questions that were less threatening (e.g., Would you be willing to provide me with a
brief summary of your background in Law Enforcement/FBI/ Cyber Forensic Expertise?) to
gradually getting into the topic at hand, cyberterrorism (e.g., What is a cyberterrorist?). By doing
so, I was able to provide an opportunity for the informant to get sufficiently comfortable talking
about the topic at hand from their own experience before jumping into questions more direct in
nature. I asked the participants to recount from their personal experiences so that they had the
opportunity to supplement the qualitative analysis and give me a sense of how to interpret the
data later.

The Participants

The following section details the methods in which I was able to recruit participants for
the study, why they were chosen, the venue in which they were interviewed, and how the
identities of these informants have been protected. Data were gathered from information
provided in complete interviews with 10 participants. More precisely, these participants
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answered my interview questions. For the face-to-face interviews, participants were asked 10
interview questions. The whole interview process was designed to last approximately 30-60
minutes and took place in a location chosen by the participant (e.g., the participant’s office or a
conference room in the building where the participant worked). In select circumstances, due to
remote locations across the country, two participants were interviewed via the telephone. Each
participant individually was individually interviewed. I met or spoke with each participant only
once. Where there was consent, audio-taped interviews occurred. I informed the participants that
the audio-tapes would be destroyed immediately after the information (provided by the
participants) recorded on each of these tapes was transcribed. In addition to having the audio
recording, I was permitted by all participants to take notes while they spoke.
To recruit participants who work in cyber forensics labs and law enforcement agencies, I
consulted information located on the Internet and subsequently identified individuals who were
computer security experts. My primary source of contact was by email and in some cases a
phone call was warranted in which I explained to them the purpose of my study. Before agreeing
to participate in my study, and before these participants answered my interview questions, I
provided them with an informed consent form and obtained signatures from them. To insure
protection of the participants, I assured them that their names would remain confidential and that
the tapes would be destroyed after the information were transcribed.
I informed each participant that they were being asked to volunteer for a research study.
This study was conducted for the University of Central Florida. I told each participant that they
were selected as a possible participant because they were a cyber forensics expert or L.E. agent. I
asked them to read the informed consent form and gave them the opportunity to ask any
questions that they may have before agreeing to take part in this study.
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Then, I informed participants about the purpose of my study. To be more precise, I
informed them that this study had no known risks involved. I told them that if they felt
uncomfortable answering my questions; they were allowed to not answer them. They were also
informed that they could withdraw from my study at any time. I informed participants that the
records of this study would be kept private. In published reports, there will be no information
included that will make it possible to identify the research participant. Research records have
been stored securely. I have stored the data on my computer and have kept these transcriptions
safe by locking them into a program file that can only be opened with a password. I have erased
each participant’s email following the completion of the study. I also informed them that their
name will never be mentioned. I informed participants that, to assist with accurate recording of
participant responses, interviews would be recorded on an audio recording device/video
recording device. Participants had the right to refuse to allow such taping without penalty. In one
case the refusal of a tape recording device did occur.
Finally, I provided participants with the researcher(s) phone and email address as well as
the contact information for professor directing the thesis, I also included the following
statement: “You are encouraged to contact the researcher(s) if you have any questions.” If they
had any questions about their rights as a research participant, they could have contacted the
University of Central Florida Institutional Review Board. They were given a copy of this
information to keep for their records. If they were not given a copy of this consent form, they
could have requested one.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND ANALYSIS

Cyberterrorism thus far has been established as a complex and intricate process that spans
multiple outcomes ranging from nuisance to mass destruction. Cyberterrorism can be committed
in places without jurisdiction (Gorge, 2007). Attackers can target critical infrastructures such as
hospitals and utility facilities (Erbschloe, 2001) and cause damage that reduces the chance for the
opponent to fight back (Schmitt, 2002). One participant from the FBI said it best when he stated
the following:
In a grand nutshell, the main message [of cyberterrorists] is to instill fear in their target
population, to disrupt their opponent’s web functioning, to provide information, to obtain
funding, to recruit members and gain sympathy from others with similar thought
patterns. A big part of this is to look powerful.
Throughout the data reduction process, many themes emerged that were distinct in what was
being conveyed as well as instances of data overlapping across participants. There is no clear-cut
start or end to cyberterrorism. Rather, cyberterrorism is a cause-and-effect chain of stimuli and
consequences that inherently build on each other. The data that follow will be presented in a way
that attempts to capture the chain reaction unfolding as each cause-and-effect is laid out. Based
on the data, five themes emerged: (1) Acknowledgement of the Existence of Cyberterrorism, (2)
Postmodern Propaganda and Publicity, (3) Detrimental Effects on Targets, (4) Media
Implications, and (5) Communicative Messages. This will provide readers with an organized
order to the data and will provide a way to progressively detail cyberterrorism, with a specific
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focus on the actual effects of their semiotic intents on targets, on the public, and on the world at
large or what is being conveyed.

Acknowledgement of the Existence of Cyberterrorism

It is important for the purpose of this study that the participants identify and define what a
cyberterrorist is and what they do. Because of the relative novelty of cyberterrorism as well as an
international inability to clearly define what cyberterror consists of, or create global laws for
prosecution, it was important to ask the participants what they considered a cyberterrorist to be.
This provided an opportunity to work from one foundation. The responses did not vary greatly,
but each answer contained an aspect or a component not mentioned by the previous informant.
One participant, a cyber forensics expert, summed up the various definitions as a paradigm rather
than a concrete theoretical concept. His definition is as follows:
“Cyberterrorist” is a term that has different meanings depending upon who is using it. A
narrow definition would be the disruption of computers and networks by cyberterrorist
organizations to create panic to advance their political or social goals. I prefer a broader
definition which would be the purposeful disruption of computers or networks to cause
harm to further the perpetrators goals. These goals may vary from religious or political
ends to personal vengeance.
This definition is one that allows for a greater scope of analysis so that many different
considerations, such as disgruntled employees to organized networks set to do harm, may be
looked at under the same principle definition. Depending on each participant’s experience, there
were addendums to this definition that included specific venues for threat such as, “The
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cyberterrorist message, generally a threat message, says ‘either change what you are doing, or
the terrorist will cause significant disruptions or destruction’” or, in the case of organized
networks of cyberterrorists, “They all work together to commit crimes through the Internet using
computers and forms of manipulation and terrorism toward victims that brings a lot of damage to
property and people.” In every interview, the participants spoke extensively on the notion of fear
for personal safety, manipulation or assets and as a result, a lack of trust in the government. The
participants also spoke of cyberterrorism in conjunction with not only media speculation leading
to the increase of fear among citizens, but also the media as a potential source for the
perpetuation of information leaking to cyberterrorists. The informants were very adamant about
cyberterrorism and the effects as a system that, “If successful, reduces trust and increases anxiety
and fear.” This combination of definitions is helpful in gaining a better perspective of who these
people are as well as motivations behind the crimes that they commit. These definitions have all
been consistent with previous research in that reasons that have been established thus far include
coercing a population or government (Clem, Galwankar, & Buck, 2003), intimidation (Arquilla,
Rondfeltd, & Zanini, 1999) and to further any ideologies that have already been established
(Conway, 2002). The actual number of attacks committed on an annual basis is so colossal that
there could not be accurate reporting on just how frequently these attacks occur. One participant,
an FBI agent, says of the number of attacks,
Some agencies, such as the National Security Agency state that they prevent 3,600 cyber
attacks per year on U.S. government agencies. That is just reported attacks alone. Many
cyber attacks go unreported as private and public companies lose credibility and trust as
they lose personal data.
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To better understand how these attacks are carried out, one must understand the full scope of
tools available for manipulation, weapons available for attack and the public outlets that
cyberterrorists utilize to connect with as many targets or members as possible.

Postmodern Propaganda and Publicity

It has been established thus far that cyberterrorists utilize specific technology-based tools
that aid in the destruction on the targets. These tools are heavily based in what can be considered
a postmodern take on crime. Postmodernism is a movement of the late twentieth century
(Docherty, 1993; Jameson, 1991) that supports the idea that humans now live in an age of
freedom from imposed rules and social constraint (McQuail, 2000). Cyberterrorism is a
manifestation of the postmodern condition, because cyber attacks occur through cyberspace and
cyberspace negates geometry. Essentially, the Internet is postmodern because it is anti-spatial
(Matusitz, 2008b). Cyberterrorists – as well as the means and weapons that they use – operate in
a space that is not an actual place where people can meet physically (Matusitz, 2008a).
As discussed earlier, there is the notion that there is no start or end to the communication
that occurs, and no distinguishable hierarchy in regards to leadership roles (Matusitz, 2008b).
There have been lists compiled that suggest that tools such as email encryptions, encrypted
computer files, websites, audio and video links, circulated photographs, and email have been
used as propaganda and publicity for the postmodern cyberterrorist cause. When asked about the
ways that cyberterrorist use the propaganda to gain publicity, one FBI agent stated,
Cyberterrorists are groups that have been identified the by United States State
Department as being a terrorist organization that happen to use the internet to
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communicate, recruit, plan attacks, provide propaganda, market, raise funds for the
cause, and scope out information about their targets.
As a reminder, Jowell and O’Donnell (2006) state that “propaganda is the deliberate, systematic
attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response
that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (p. 7). Propaganda has been established thus
far as a compilation of tools that a cyberterrorist can have at their disposal. The tools described
below; email, virus spreading, websites, and video posts are just a few of the tools that
cyberterrorists will use in order to carry out the manipulations and machinations of the task at
hand. These tools, all electronically related, are what separate cyberterrorists from the traditional
counterparts that came before. Once the electronic component is eliminated, what is left are
weapons that similar to the weapons used in violent attacks, such as bombing or shootings.

Tools

Email

Email is one tool used mainly for communication between members of a cyberterrorist
organization. As noted earlier, in a plea for the supporters of the Islamic Army in Iraq to register
for the mailing list after the terrorist website was closed down (Kholmann, 2006),
correspondence in this manner is a legitimate outlet for continued communication. The Diab10
was another case in which Turkish and Moroccan suspects communicated through email with the
purpose of causing destruction through virus spreading (Schneier, 2005). Communication
through email is a well-known method used by cyberterrorists but there is an often overlooked
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aspect to the merit of email for cyberterrorist purposes. One participant, a L.E. agent, suggested
that there is another reason for email to be used to target victims,
They [cyberterrorists] use legitimate and illegitimate reasons to contact people, but then
may misuse the information they collect, such as identification and personal information.
There are various schemes and scandals that are used through the computer, the Internet,
and email.
What is occurring here is that not only are scams being pulled on those who may be unsuspecting
individuals but there is a key component occurring as well: information gathering. An important
and sometimes ignored component in assessing the depth of destruction in the aftermath of a
crime is that there needed to be some form of information gathering on a target in the first place.
As the same L.E. agent explains in his response,
These are communications between offenders and victims. Some may be encrypted or
very clear. Again, they tend to be manipulative and play on the needs and emotions of
potential victims-typically those who are elderly, teenagers, children-generally the most
vulnerable populations willing to buy into the scam and would more freely give up
information. There may be specific targets or the victims may be chosen randomly.
Email is one way to generate information but it is not the only way. In a speech he gave in 2003,
pertaining to a recovered al Qaeda training manual, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed
that, “Using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at
least 80 percent of all information required about the enemy” (Weimann, 2006). Information

gathering occurs through a variety of measures including but not limited to email and websites.
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Virus

One of the most common forms of attacks on victims is that of virus spreading (Melissa
Macro Virus, the Bugbear virus, and the MSBlaster worm) and the destruction that occurs
following the corruption of a computer network. One L.E. agent recounts an instance of
cyberterrorism that he and his unit were directly involved in:
I personally have been involved in several cases of cyberterrorism. In most cases that
were investigated by my previous agency, the cyberterrorism involved the destruction of
valuable organization files by disgruntled employees, essentially acts of vengeance by a
person who had felt they were wronged by the organization. In one case, for example, a
computer technician, angry at a police department decision, placed a “logic bomb” in the
police computer system that was employee.
Other examples of cyberterrorist employing some sort of “time bomb” virus program were in
documented cases where these criminals, with the intention of closing down major switching
hubs, programmed a virus to obliterate emergency 911 services throughout the eastern seaboard,
in order to cause the collapse of all switches in Manhattan (Denning, 1999). Another case in
which a cyberterrorist could cause destruction would be the instance in which the end goal of a
cyberterrorist was to shut down an emergency medical services (EMS) dispatch center; given
this, the damage could be done by launching a computer virus rather than detonating explosives,
which provides a greater risk to the attacker (Berinato, 2002).
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Websites

It is safe to say that in the technological age of present day, there are millions of websites
being run right now, thousands of which are supported by terrorists. Websites provide an
unregulated and unidentified arena where the rule of thumb is “anything goes” from transcribed
speeches from political leaders hoping to change public opinion, to a gift-shop like outlet
allowing for the purchase of bumper stickers, and t-shirts sponsoring the organization (Weimann,
2006). The interesting notion, as mentioned before with the cat-and-mouse nature of Islamist
cyberterrorist Irhabi007 (Kholmann, 2006), is that these terrorist websites are frequently put up
and taken down so they can cause their damage and still be maintained for another day. The
general scope for the use of websites is so vast that they provide a forum, or a safe haven for any
level of content that a cyberterrorist feels is necessary to air to keep motivation for the cause
intact, for reasons of member recruitment or to raise funds from supporters. As one participant
suggested, “Cyberterrorist organizations around the world have people that are dedicated and
communicating back and forth to enhance and promote and fund their operations. They are
organized.” Any number of these reasons can be considered practical applications for the
website, as if it were a business venture. In regards to cyberterrorists and the defacement of
other, legitimately purposeful websites, one participant, an FBI agent stated,
Many cyberterrorists target sites that are in competition with them or critique them. For
example, I know of several [legitimate] sites that are constantly being attacked. One
group hacks the site and posts pornography links on the web site that users would find
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immoral and disgusting. Others post their group identification in the form of threats to
instill fear in the usual web site visitors.
Outcomes of this nature play upon the psyche of the targets in a way that, while it is not life
threatening, the outcome still retains unfavorable consequences. Another FBI agent recalls a
similar instance in which the website of a government figure was defaced:
I was peripherally involved in an investigation of an act of cyberterrorism directed
against President Clinton’s White House website. The President’s website was
vandalized and a number of defamatory statements were placed on the site. The
cyberterrorists were quite sophisticated and defeated some excellent software. Our
investigation suggested that the attack was launched from China, and may have had
Chinese Government support. We found overseas attacks such as this one very hard
to trace, and we were never able to fully identify the hackers.
This excerpt brings up a notion that was consistent throughout the interviews. Because of the
nature of cyberterrorism, actually capturing a criminal has thus far proved to be difficult. Every
participant, at some point during the interview, suggested that what can mainly be accomplished
is countersecurity on the part of the United States. One L.E. agent even stated that “They use the
same available tools that we could obtain from internet sites or hacker groups; it could be
anybody out there with computer skills building a website to suit whatever criminal intent
motivates them.” The notion that any content could be posted by any person credits the damage
that could be done by an individual or network hoping to cause destruction.
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Video Posts

Because websites have become a public forum for the opinion of anybody, relayed to
anybody who will listen, there is no regulation on what can be posted or what ultimately does get
posted on these websites. The most salient and destructive tool that could be used by a
cyberterrorist network creating and maintaining their own websites is that of video footage. It
was mentioned earlier that many pieces of footage could be altered to create fabricated
circumstances with the intention of manipulation based on a falsehood, such as the digitally
altered uniforms on soldiers, or a fake press release of a prominent figure declaring war
(Shulman, 1999). A cyber forensic expert commented on the destruction that could occur from
these altered videos:
It is so harmful because these networks take footage and manipulate it in such a way that
they portray terrorists as heroes, in some cases martyrs for a cause. They take video
footage of the soldiers before, giving a testament to good and evil and right and wrong
and they post footage of attacks on the websites for anybody to see. They can also post
events where they can do everything live. Posting video, making hostage tapes like the
Nicholas Berg beheading, terrorist interviews and making press releases, well those are
the factors out there for anybody to witness.
Along with the video footage on these websites are running live tallies of pertinent statistics to
the website: how many martyrs were killed and a running total of killed Islamic enemies
(Weimann, 2006). The goal for anybody watching these tapes is ultimately to become fearful.
The following is from a cyber forensic expert discussing the motivation behind the posting of
videos in how they relate to attacks that are carried out after the posting of these videos,
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Well I think we see it in cyberterrorist propaganda. We see these “tapes” made by Osama
bin Laden or somebody designated by him--- they come out periodically with these
threats…and most of that is just rhetoric. They are trying to keep the fear level up and
the intimidation level. But then periodically, obviously when something happens around
the world, whether they are directly involved or not, a major explosion or something,
they always try to take credit.
It is the observation that the rhetoric played out in these videos is meant to keep fear and
intimidation levels up that is important in the overall understanding of cyberterrorist use of
propaganda. The same idea goes back to the notion of “terrorism as theater” in which the main
goal is not to harm as many hostages as possible, rather, get as many people as possible to see
the harm and consequently become affected by it. This aspect allows for the duel benefit of
causing immediate and recognizable physical damage as well as having the psychological
damage unfold at a later point in time. By posting violent videos on websites that are self-run,
they can control the arena which allows for strategically planned out content put in place for
viewers.
The timing of these videos is crucial to the fear levels as well. September 11, 2001 has
been touted as a day that nobody will ever forget. Even the numerical date itself (9-11) is
symbolic in that the universal number for emergency response systems in the United States is
911. One FBI agent suggested that cyberterrorists play upon this as another fear tactic meant to
scare:
The biggest thing is that they get top members or leaders to put out these tapes and that’s
how they actually put the message out and disseminate that threat for us to see. Our [the
nation’s] threat level doesn’t change when those messages come but it sort of brings you
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back to where you were on 9/11 or where you were when a particular tragedy occurs so it
sort of resonates again what the potential is. The videos are a big source of fear and then
any time the anniversary and dates come up the chatter will increase and they start to
make those threats again. When we prosecute the ones that were convicted or execute
terrorists, those dates are very symbolic, so people sort of get nervous, like 9/11 for
example for the most part is fear-driven. We will see those tapes surface right around
those times as well.
As explained by this participant, there is a lot of symbolic emphasis placed upon certain dates,
such as September 11th or specific dates of terrorist executions. The important aspect of his
comment to pay attention to is that even though the threat levels do not escalate when these
videos turn up, there is enough chatter generated to allow for people to have an emotionally
trigger response. The FBI does not place emphasis on these tapes as proof of threat, but the
people that may see them, that also may be affected by them are citizens that do not hold a
position in the government and as such may be susceptible to increased levels of fear.

Detrimental Effects on Targets

Up until this point, there has been a strong focus on cyberterrorists and the tools utilized
to cause damage or instill fear. Little has been dedicated to the targets themselves. Targets on the
battlefields of war are soldiers wearing a different uniform. Targets in gang wars are those who
are trespassing on “turf”. One may ask “who exactly is a target of cyberterrorism?” The answer
across all the participants is that there is no answer. One L.E. agent summed up a target list best
by stating, “Government, financial institutions, individuals, businesses, social groups, political
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parties, and the list goes on and on…” This list is so extensive and so all encompassing that the
equivalent would be to say that there is nobody who is safe from attack. It is in the infinite
number of possibilities, from the government to the everyman that leaves people fearful and
lacking in trust in those who offer protection. While the primary goal of terrorism is a process of
communication between terrorists and target audiences (Tuman, 2003), cyberterrorism also seeks
to send a powerful signal meant to frighten and coerce the target. The following section will
detail the various motivations behind small and large scale targets and the emotional aspects of
fear for safety and lack of faith in the government that accrues from being targeted.

Small Scale

By calling this specific group of targets “small scale” targets, it is not the author’s
intention of minimizing what could be considered a traumatic experience. Rather, the label
“small scale” refers to the amount motivation behind the attacker and the overall product left
after an attack. One participant stated “Cyberterrorists, by the nature of destruction (to computers
and networks) – are purposeful and designed to sow panic. The motivation is more along the
lines of political or revenge as opposed to theft, or profit.” By calling a circumstance “small
scale,” it can be classified the latter: motivation for an attack as revenge. In most of these cases,
the threat comes from an attacker who may be a former employee, familiar with the computer
network, wishing to cause harm (Misra, 2005). An example of cyberterrorism as an attack of
revenge took place in 2000, when the Maroochy Shire Council’s computer system was
penetrated by an Australian cyberterrorist (a disgruntled consultant who was rejected for a job at
a water treatment plant) who manipulated it to overflow raw sewage, causing contamination
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along the Sunshine Coast (in Australia) releasing 264,000 gallons of raw sewage into rivers and
parks, (Clem, Galwankar, & Buck, 2003). Granted the release of that amount of raw sewage is
not destruction on a small scale, but rather the motivation for a rejected and disgruntled job
applicant was the mess that was made as an act of retaliation, as opposed to meaning to cause
long term and lasting emotional damage and fear.
An additional concern and one that has been mentioned earlier is information gathering
on a target for purposes of mal intent. A cyber forensic expert expounds on the notion of
specifically targeted victims for purposes of gaining additional information through sources that
the victims would typically trust by stating that,
Anyone can be a target; just like other criminal activity. Even those who don’t use the
computer or the Internet can be conned and have their identity unknowingly stolen
through computer programs used by banks and public institutions or agencies. They play
on vulnerable victims. These victims tend to be sympathetic, needy and greedy- generally
there is some form of mental or physical harm involved.
The overall trend in small scale targets is some other means than the notion of terrorism as
theater. In both examples, the end result was raw sewage being overflowed or identity theft.
These are goals in which the perpetrator would not want to draw attention to his or herself
because once this occurs, the end goal has been compromised. Because these crimes have fallen
into a small scale motivated by revenge or scam, they do not qualify as a large scale target.
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Large Scale

Where the small-scale targets are considered to be motivated by revenge or scam, the
large-scale targets have more severe outcomes like financial collapse, violent trauma for victims
and fatalities. With large scale targets, there is greater potential for a chain reaction of events that
cause damage. One example of this chain of reaction, given by one participant, an FBI agent
said, “After an attack, major impacts are usually cost – cyber attacks lead to expensive counter
measures. From there, lack of trust among people who rely on the target, and eventually the
sowing of discord within a population.” This example illustrates how, when there is an attack
(especially one that compromises the financial and economic foundation of a country), the
emotional reaction is heightened more than if it were an isolated incident like the one about the
Australian employee. The next excerpt from a FBI agent clearly outlines the chain of reactions:
I don’t think you could put a monetary figure on it. I would just think it would be
substantial. Huge damage could be done to the commerce of this country, to the financial
base of this country, in a single keystroke if they were successful, periodically shutting
things down for days and that also would instill a certain amount of fear because then
people lose their sense of confidence that the government could protect them.
Cyberterrorism is a little different from normal terrorism in that when a bomb going off is
immediate, it’s horrible, and again it brings a lot of damage to property and people.
Cyberterrorism may not instantly physically hurt an individual but collectively could hurt
the country substantially.
The key elements to look at here are that cyberterrorism does create damage, albeit not always in
the way that traditional terrorism would cause immediate and catastrophic damage to a person’s
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physical well being. The second element to look at is that, not only would the systemic workings
of a financial entity be out of commission for up to a few days, but the result would also be
people losing a sense of confidence in the ability of those whose job and expertise are protection.
Another aspect to assess is that widespread damage would occur. In the case of a bombing or
physical attack, the wave of how many would be effected would be those immediately targeted,
family members of those who are targeted with the potential to reach others beyond the scope of
familiar ties. With the instance of cyberterrorism, it is important to note that those who are
affected could reach beyond the scope of immediate targets, but branch out across the country.
The example of finance is perfect because of the countrywide dependence on monetary stability.
The very last aspect to keep in mind is the notion of “a single keystroke.” While a single
keystroke may be a hyperbole, it does hold ground in the reality that, with cyberterrorism, one is
not combating masked attackers with guns, or soldiers or any other picture of “enemy” that
comes to mind. What one is dealing with is potentially a single individual, with one computer,
pressing the right buttons. The nameless, faceless enemy plays into the fear of the unknown for
those who were attacked and it has been a reoccurring theme throughout all the participants’
accounts that these criminals are rarely, if ever, caught and prosecuted.
It is important to keep in mind the notion of cyberterrorism as a chain reaction of events
that play upon each other. Thus far, it has been established that cyberterrorists cause destruction
and target victims using the Internet. They attack others’ websites and deface them and they use
their own websites for communication in the group. The following comes from an FBI agent in
response to the emotional impact cyberterrorism has on the targets:
Three major groupings – databases, networks, and websites. Databases are deleted or
compromised, usually involving financial institutions, causing financial panic. Networks
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are interrupted with the purpose of compromising infrastructure (electric grids,
communication grids, etc.) again, disrupting the citizens lives – making people lose trust.
Websites are defaced, again to make people fearful and communicate the terrorist’s
message.
This excerpt is important because there is recognition of the message that the cyberterrorist
wants to communicate. The phrase “to communicate the terrorist’s message” allows for
something broader than just the pleasure one would get out of defacing a website. These criminal
acts fall into the larger scale, where the motive or intent goes beyond just being a nuisance, or
creating some other havoc on a target. The additional component is emotionally driven, designed
to provoke a response out of the target or whoever else may be watching. It still stands to
reason, even in light of preventative measures that certain elements of fear are still pervasive in
the minds of citizen. The following section details two distinctive components of fear often
mentioned by the participants: fear for safety and lack of trust in the government.

Fear

Up to this point, the participants have detailed effects of cyberterrorism that play a part in
affecting the psyche of the population. One participant said it best when he noted,
Quite often the terrorist action seeks a multiplier beyond the immediate damage cause by
their cyberterrorism, they generally provide a threat as well of continued damage unless
their demands are met. In most cases the fear, the reaction, and the uncertainty is more
damaging that the actual damage wrought by the cyber attack.
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This example is yet another that suggests that there is something more to an attack than what
damage can be viewed at the surface level. It has been noted through multiple examples and
participant responses that these important, emotionally driven aspects are a major contributor and
component to the overall scope and results of cyberterrorism.

Safety

Building upon what has already been discussed, there are a lot of different outlets, such
as websites, videos, and email that allow for the dissemination of cyberterrorist messages to the
public. As one FBI agent comments,
What I am being told as far as a base threat they communicate a lot over the Internet and
they will intentionally send messages to each other and the pubic as a demonstration.
They say “look what’s happened in this area or look what’s happened in that area” and
they threaten to mimic those events worldwide. And that is where they basically instill
fear. If there is someone associated with the organization, they can kill people or cause
an explosive to go off that instills fear in other people because now people recognize
that they are vulnerable and now all of a sudden that could happen anywhere. When
you see that tactic go off, that’s when a smaller man can create a large widespread
form of fear. The group communicates in many different ways and now again those are
things and information we receive that are work related but that small event can create a
lot of fear where we are.
Once again, the main premise is that the end goal is not the damage that occurs from a given
attack; rather, it is the ensuing fear that results from that will stay with participants for a longer
53

amount of time that is a major premise for attackers. Additionally, when there is fear of being
attacked, civilians look toward those with specialized background for help and, in some cases,
there is no answer to that. Civilians may start to question who will protect them and how.
Government agencies, whose job it is to protect civilians, may be at a crossroads for how to stop
these attacks from occurring.

Loss of Trust

This is not to say that the government officials not aware or working on solutions to
protect from cyber attacks. In fact, they are very much aware because that have been the target of
attack themselves. When faced with the crossroads of how to go about protecting the public, an
FBI agent discussed the FBI perspective of the attacks that have been plaguing the government,
The cyberterrorists target what I would consider sensitive agencies and operations. I
would note the fact that every day there are people using computers to get into the FBI
databases for the purpose of embarrassing the FBI, or to taint the data, or somehow
introduce viruses or whatever. It goes on in the Pentagon, NSA, in every major U.S.
agency trying to guard itself against that type of an attack because the cyberterrorists
know how a network system operates and will attempt to shut down a considerable
portion of the government. If they are successful. If for no other reason it could be a
prelude to a standard violent attack somewhere just to get our attention. I would say that
cyberterrorism is every bit as sophisticated as we are and they are working diligently to
try and penetrate every secure system the U.S. government operates at all times. I am sure
that an attack on a power system or like the attack in Atlanta in the CDC, shutting down
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and penetrating their operations or get into their data base would be damage to us. If left
unchecked, cyberterrorists could accomplish anything they want to. I know for a fact that
the FBI and the CDC and all of the military operations are dedicating huge resources and
bringing in all kinds of talent. They’ve been programmed to just secure the operations so
that hopefully they can stay one step ahead.
This account is one that fortifies the claim that cyberterrorism is penetrating even the highest and
most protected agencies in the United States. The noteworthy aspect to this account is that there
are people who are put in place and whose sole job is to prevent these attacks from occurring.
Additionally, there may be situations in which the lack of trust spills over into situations
of healthcare professionals. Janczewski and Colarik (2005) address the notion that there may be
a lack of trust that occurs everywhere, from the civilian population to authority figures including
government and medical authority. The example given for health situations stems from records
that could have been tampered with in a hospital. Janczewski and Colarik (2005) give the
scenario of a major political figure being admitted into the hospital for a medical issue, and have
a cyberterrorist gain access to a hospitals’ medical database and change the medication to
something that person may be allergic to. The nurse administers the drug and that patient dies.
This same scenario can occur with people who are not high profile; rather, they can be patients
admitted for routine medical procedures. In the same vein, cyberterrorists could tamper with
medical or health insurance records, or modify computer-based prescriptions to life-threatening
doses at pharmacies (Rockel, 2005).
A lot of information was mentioned about fear for safety and the lack of trust that citizens
have in the government’s ability to protect them. It can be easy to fall prey to the expectations set
forth in movies and television shows like Live Free or Die Hard and 24 that portray the most
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extreme aspects of cyberterrorism. In reality, the source of information about cyberterrorism that
gets disseminated to the public is the media. In the following section, the role of the media will
be discussed as well as the effects and consequences that occur as a result.

Media Implications

By and large, the media is an entity that plays a significant role in explaining, reporting,
teaching, and at times, persuading the audience to take some sort or action or instruct them on
how to feel or behave (Barry, 1990). In regards to how this pans out for cyberterrorism, it is safe
to say that those who wish to do harm know the media functions and manipulate them to serve
their purpose. Because the media is such a strong outlet for communication to the public,
cyberterrorists are aware of the potential and seek media attention for a variety of reasons. A
L.E. agent elaborates on the media’s role in cyberterrorism by stating “Cyberterrorists look to
attacks that will gain publicity, threaten the public, or lead people to lose faith in either their
political or financial institutions. An important component of most cyberterrorism is media
attention.” This section will cover the functions of the media and the effects and consequences
that come from media attention.

Media’s Role

The role of the media was brought up many times over the course of all the interviews
that were conducted. There must be a venue connected with cyberterrorism that advances the
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propaganda: the media (Cowen, 2006). All participants were willing to concede that the media
plays a significant role in not only disseminating information to the public but quite
unexpectedly, there was an overwhelming amount of criticism of the media from many of the
participants. Many participants were quick to suggest that the media plays more of a negative
role in the scope of cyberterrorism rather than a positive role. Participants often accused the
media of being a hindrance to investigation or creating spin to influence outcomes of emotional
effect on the public. The following excerpt comes from a cyber forensic expert with respect to
the multifaceted roles the media plays:
The media influences criminal activity in several ways and this holds true for cyber crime
as well. (a) They bring crimes and criminal activity information to the public; (b) they
investigate reports of criminal activity; (c) they often put fear into people with their
reporting; (d) they tend to hype news up in order to make a name for themselves; and (e)
I would guess that the media in general are not aware that the Internet can be a dangerous
tool for offenders and potentially dangerous for victims.
The criticism that the media spins reports was emphatic throughout other interviews as
well, with examples that participants chose from their own lives. There were many examples that
participants gave from their own lives when the media interrupted or compromised investigations
or caused unnecessary fear. One FBI agent, who made it clear that he was not a fan of the
media’s efforts in reporting, recounted a story that was unfolding at the time of the interview.
The location of the agent is blanked out for privacy purposes. He stated,
I can’t think of the guy’s name, local here in ----------- and he set up an internet site,
he was talking a lot about the government, not that it was a crime. But he was pumping
out what was happening over in Iraq and he was saying how wrong it was and how his
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beliefs were about how much support the terrorist had. The media showed up at his house
and his web page was done in Arabic which was difficult to understand but they
translated it over the news and they basically followed this kid and focused on why he
would say such things, why would he create this web page. He was one person, a 20 year
old kid, who worked in some type of computer programming job and he was savvy in
computers, but he created this web page that just sparked an enormous response from
--------- and all he did was have a P.C. and the right frame of mind. What resulted was he
was on the news he-- bringing back memories of the war, bringing back negativity from
what he was putting out. All he meant to do was create this web page, but, he certainly
passed on a vulnerability to ---------- and we were certainly accessible. It’s a propagation
that is fueled by the media. They [the media] could try and foster more fear out there
than probably reality warrants at times.
This excerpt is a classic example of how the media runs with a story that may not be entirely
grounded in things relevant to the subject at hand. In this case, the media was calling this person
a cyberterrorist, when it could have been looked at as a freedom of speech. The participant in this
story references the feelings that were brought up in the community by the media taking on this
story over a prolonged period of time. He mentions that from one website and the subsequent
media attention, negative feelings of insecurity and vulnerability about war efforts was brought
to the forefront for anybody watching the news to relive again and again.
Throughout the interviews, there was a lot of focus on the consequences that played out
that were attributed to the media. In the next section, the discussion focuses primarily on the
media spurring negative reactions from those who wish to do harm.
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Effects and Consequences

The participants of this study time and again told of how tactics in dealing with an enemy
must be chosen with care. Though there was a great emphasis on the media as a grasping entity
designed to increase ratings and money, the main concern for participants was ensuring that the
enemy did not get the upper hand in the attacks. A L.E. agent told of his dealings with the media
and the caution that occurs when relaying information:
I would guess that the information is limited as many in law enforcement know that the
media presents stories in ways to make bucks rather than to inform. We do not want to
provide details that would either lead a group to define themselves as successful or
encourage further attacks.
This passage is significant because there is an emphasis on counter communication with the
cyberterrorists themselves. Cyberterrorists recognize that the media must be used in order to
manipulate and form desired images in the minds of the public (Laqueur, 2006). That law
enforcement as a whole is looking at the media communication that they report and analyzing it
is a testament to the power, good or bad, which the media yields. As a mode of communication,
law enforcement is using the media as a vehicle to yield a report that will best serve the public. It
does no good to any of the parties to misconstrue the details of an attack for purposes of “hype”
because it has been established that while cyberterrorists can communicate by using the media,
they can also be on the receiving end of communication. At this point, the media is aiding in the
transaction of communication. In the next example, an excerpt by a L.E. agent, this transaction
can be better identified.
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They do have a role when it comes to visual pictures and all the information they put out
and that fear spreads. I am not a big fan of journalism so I have to put that up front. I
think they disseminate and should pass out information on how to protect yourself and
they also refuse to allow law enforcement typically to provide the basic information.
There are few cyber attacks reported and if there is one, the media overplays the risks
and tries to gain ratings by reporting all kinds of myths. It is possible that the media may
encourage others to follow suit in a so called copycat crime. It is devastating when the
media discloses information that may be used against targets. We in law enforcement try
to vindicate that perception of fear and not capitalize on it
The notion of copycat crimes is the first that has been mentioned about criminals committing a
crime based on something they have seen rather than the media reporting what they have seen
based on a crime. Another interesting point in this excerpt is that use of “we” by the L.E. agent.
It is clear that there is no love lost between law enforcement and the media, and there is
definitely a tension occurring that does not allow them to work together for the good of the
nation and for the good of protection.
Lastly, in regards to the media, it is also important to understand that the role of the
media as a source of communication for terrorists has changed. The media was once used as a
jumping-off point for terrorists to advertise their videos (Begleiter, 2001). There threats and
demands would be recorded on tapes and sent to agencies (government or media) for terrorists to
have demands or ideologies heard. A postmodern take on this is slowly phasing out media
participation and replacing it with live feed on websites (Begleiter, 2001). With the advancement
of technology and cyberterrorists advancing as well, there is less and less of a need for an
intermediary in terms of getting the media to post videos. One of the most popular examples, that
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of the Nicholas Berg beheading (Glasser & Coll, 2005), was a testament to the circulation of
videos that was completely annexed from the traditional media. This example is pertinent in that
cyberterrorists no longer have to worry about the rules or censorship that accompanies the media.
A cyber forensic expert broke down the cycle in the following excerpt,
In terms of the terrorist interaction with the media, it seems that the internet is
functioning as a source of change in communications. They [cyberterrorists] basically can
function using a particular medium and that effected overall interactions. They have to
put their events together much like any organization in the format that would be easy and
palatable for a news organization. For example they call news conferences. The new
media of a posted video on a website, much like the traditional consumer now allows the
audience member to select the time the place and the device that they are going to get the
drama. So the interactive media become much more important, unlike the news media
that can censor what is heard. Now they just post the content and send it directly to an
audience. There is no censor that their population sees. Most media is a two edge sword,
it’s liberating in terms of content but it also gives audience access of what is out there
from groups that you are not comfortable with. It’s much more direct now. You get a lot
more live coverage produced by these cyberterrorists.
This excerpt is so important because it features an independence from the media that has not
been discussed up until this point. This excerpt discusses the potential for these cyberterrorists to
place anything and everything they desire on the web for anybody to access. Some people could
say that the public should not access it, sparing themselves emotional consequences they might
not be ready for, but in essence that does not solve the communicative problem at hand. The
reality is that the content is posted, the messages are communicated, and there is very little that
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can be done, especially because, as it was mentioned before, these criminals are computer savvy,
putting up images for and taking them down, cat-and-mouse style.
It has been discussed up to this point that a cyberterrorist uses propaganda as a means of
causing emotional fear and lack of trust in the government’s ability to protect them. It has also
been established that the media plays a vital role in disseminating information and facilitating a
transaction of information to eventually return back to cyberterrorists. In the following section a
bulk of the research questions will address the perspective of analyzing what is being
communicated.

Communicative Messages

This section will detail the communicative messages that are being played out by
cyberterrorists utilizing propaganda and how the semiotic aspect of Stamper’s Ladder play a part
in the overall equation on the targets. To be more precise, the researcher, examined these issues,
attempting to synthesize the participant’s responses.

Research Question 1

What are the communicative motives being conveyed through propaganda being utilized
by cyberterrorists?
The communicative messages being conveyed by cyberterrorists are multifaceted. What
the data have shown is that there are many potential motives to carrying out these actions. There
have been motivations of causing unrest and fear in targets, just as there have been motivations
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of shaking the faith of citizens in the government’s ability to protect them from harm. There may
even be emotional repercussions of those whose job is to protect manifesting in the form of
doubt or questioning the ability to perform. There is also the concept of terror as theater which
sparks motives of wanting attention for misdeeds. Many participants spoke on the overarching
theme of cyberterrorists and the notion that the goal is not about the “kill,” but more about who
is watching the kill and what follows after that. The notion of terror as a theatrical process was
reinforced by one participant, an L.E. agent, as he sought to emphasize what the criminals
ultimately want to convey.
Understanding what cyber criminals want to convey can vary from case to case. I would
say it is on a continuum from an unorganized plan of communication to well-organized
planned communication. Often it is an issue of control; they want to “flex their muscles”
and have some control over their victims, promote a cause, or put fear into a country or
region, as the terrorism of Sept 11, 2001 did to the United States.
Again, the notion here is that every movement, every communication, and every web post or link
to a video clip is symbolic in ulterior motives. A web video of a beheading is not constructed
solely for “entertainment” purposes; it is to symbolize strength and disregards for rules. It is to
say to the world at large “We know you have rules and we do not care.” It is a symbolic message
that causes fear and panic and puts doubt in the minds of citizens who thought they were
otherwise protected.
When cyberterrorists hack into websites and deface them, it symbolically represents a
challenge. It is not just an attempt to mess with, or annoy, the website owner, especially when
the owner of the website is a political figure. The message that is being sent, again, is a challenge
to the authority and the integrity of the law system and the ability for the government to protect
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its citizens from any potential danger or damage that could occur from an attack. The message
also serves as a symbol to those who are not affiliated with the website owner, but who may
encounter the defacement and become alarmed.

Research Question 2

How do the media play a role in the perpetuation of the propaganda?
This research question is a continuum of what occurred previously in messages that were
sent through propaganda. Without media input, there may not be as much fear circulating about
cyberterrorism simply because people may not be aware of it. An overwhelming response from
my participants, pertaining to questions about media, yielded sympathies that were negative or
critical of the validity and caliber of reporting. Yet, it is irrefutable that the media perpetuates the
propaganda be it through misreporting to create hype or simply by reporting on an occurrence
which, in turn, fuels the morale of the cyberterrorist group to be recognized, and which, in turn,
fuels the mission. A cyber forensic expert commented on what the media’s role in inadvertently
perpetuating cyberterrorism:
There have been a number of examples of the media perpetuating cyberterrorism. The
PLO is an example of a terrorist group, evolving into a political governmental
amphitheater. That transition added to the Hamas right now, has gone through a
transition and the goal of the terrorists group is long term, particularly if the goal is to get
media coverage, recruitment and resources and makes them the dominant group in that
perspective. There are triggers that I have put together such as is the media showing
footage that is brutal or unique, or is there a symbolic value or are there fatalities or
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injuries. These triggers that coincide with ‘terrorism as theater’ makes sense. If you have
more short term goals or if you are looking to overthrow a government or country and
you don’t have any interest on the audiences then you are not going to be involved in the
terrorism as theater. The benefits of coverage are not going to be the theater and would
be considered counterproductive. They bring in more world help and aid for that
government.
These remarks are interesting in that they directly relate to media perpetuating attacks. The
participant makes the point of noting that short term goals – the purpose being an eventual end –
will not generate the terrorism as theater motivation. However, when the main focus is the
audience and the aim is to gain power through fear, that goal goes on forever with no clear-cut or
well defined end. This notion contributes to the theory that while cyberterrorism does create
harm, it is a process whose ultimate goal is larger and more abstract of a fulfillment for the
attacker.

Research Question 3

What aspects of the social world, according to Stamper’s Semiotic model, are being met?
Stamper’s Semitic Ladder s begins with a physical entity which in this case would be a
computer itself. At this point, it is a regular computer that has the ability to share pictures, look
up recipes, find directions, and chat in real time with friends. For a cyberterrorist, a computer at
the physical level is a weapon. At the empirical level, a level in which patterns have the ability to
form, that computer takes the role of being a host to potential patterns of propaganda that the
terrorist chooses to disseminate. This could be in the form of constantly posted propaganda
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displaying acts of crime or violence for anybody to see. At the syntactical level, the propaganda
begins to be disseminated with a purpose. A cyberterrorist, functioning on the syntactical level,
logically arranges the propaganda to be stationed in the most effective manner possible. This
may be websites, email, spam mail, and encrypted files that get sent to targets. The next level,
the semantic level, in which meaning becomes attached, would allow for the cyberterrorists to
take a threat beyond a website into an entity that it more symbolic than “just” another computer.
Every action has a purpose that becomes imbedded and will not be dislodged easily. A computer
is a weapon that is capable of shutting down emergency response systems, or collapsing financial
enterprises or unleashing raw sewage into the water systems. The pragmatic level is the
conversation that is occurring during and as a result of the cyberterrorist attacks. People are
exposed to the propaganda that was put in place to draw out a specific reaction of fear or
governmental mistrust. At this point, the actual computer, the actual website, the actual words
are more than words, metal, and pictures. They represent power and control and an element of
the unknown to be frightened of. The targets, either having been hit, or having been exposed to
this propaganda can no longer take a website, for example, as some hidden entity displayed on a
computer screen. Instead, a website may have become a vehicle that threatens, that displays acts
of power, and that steals the target’s sense of security be replacing it with doubt and fear.
The social world is the culmination of all the other levels of Stamper’s Semiotic Ladder
working together in action. The result is the formation of beliefs, expectations, commitments,
contracts, laws, and culture to form. In turn, those not affiliated with the cyberterrorist group
may be inclined to some sort of action (Hensgen et al., 2003a). By action, it is understood that it
could be at the governmental level, requiring that law be created stopping cyberterrorist or at the
level of an everyday civilian whose action is to become fearful. Because meaning on the social
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level is contingent upon meaning in the other levels first, it is apparent from the testimony of my
participants that there is action being spurned into place. As noted earlier, there are people
working for the government, taking countermeasures to cyberterrorists and creating programs
that are designed to stay one step ahead of cyberterrorism.
An important aspect is the notion that there are those that do not see cyberterrorism as a
crime. Stamper’s Semiotic Ladder at the level of the social world, hold in regard the formation of
beliefs and expectations in regard to a catalyst. The catalyst has been cyberterrorism and the
aspect that the world view created may not be the same world view as the United States world
view cannot be overlooked. The next section deals with how the aspects of the social world are
being carried out. As such, the topic must be assessed from the context of the global world and
the implications that cyberterrorism has across the international community must be understood.

Research Question 4

How are the aspects of Stamper’s Ladder in regards to the social world being carried
out?
With the social world aspect of Stamper’s Ladder, the focus is on the big picture and how
the components in the big picture play off of each other, panning out across the globe.
Cyberterrorists can work across borders without concern for jurisdiction. For example, an
incident in 1998 occurred when emails reading “We are the Internet Black Tigers and we are
doing this to disrupt your communications” were sent to the Sri Lankan embassy, crashing
computer systems and subsequently instilling fear in those who were attacked (Denning, 2000).
Meanwhile, halfway across the globe, cyberterrorists in the same year of 1998 created a “time
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bomb” that shut down major switching hubs in Manhattan, that destroyed emergency 911
services throughout the eastern seaboard (Denning, 1999). The importance here is to recognize
that not only is cyberterrorism occurring across different geographical areas; the motives behind
the action are, also, not interpreted in only one context or only by one moral code. In an
interview with a cyber forensic expert, he stated that,
There can be a two or three other audiences that are simultaneously dealing with, or
participating as members of terrorist groups in other countries, with a demonstration of
what they can do. You can have an audience of targets, supporters or even an audience of
more potential kooks. It can be a message to the Muslim world. And that message can
be interpreted 180 degrees different that “we can do these terrible things to you” and the
terrorist sympathizers around the world say “we can do these wonderful things, we are a
powerful group”. That’s why communication allows a single event to reach multiple
audiences with different messages from that one single event. It can be through the use
of the Internet, the interpretive audiences and communications can occur and the terrorist
organization, through their Internet, can help steer certain light into interpretation in
particular ways. They can make martyrs out of their own that were killed.
This participant highlights the possibility that for a given action and interpretation of the action
by a person or a group, those same actions will be defined differently based on the person or
group that commits the threat or crime. The beliefs and expectations about cyberterrorism that
my participants spoke about are strongly anti-cyberterrorism, expressing anger and disgust for
those who commit crimes via the internet. Because these crimes are actually committed, I can
only assume that not everybody feels anger and disgust at the concept of cyberterrorism. I do not
know the exact ratio of supporters to non-supporters. Nevertheless, suggesting that the whole
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world backs the belief of the United States would be inaccurate. It would also be potentially
damaging to communications that may occur on a governmental level should there be
international negotiations and attempts to regulate and prosecute cyberterrorists.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Summary of Findings

The definition of a cyberterrorist, what the propaganda consists of, who the targets are
and the emotional effects, the role of the media in the equation and the communicative messages
of cyberterrorists according to Stamper’s Semiotic Ladder have all been assessed. From the data
analyzed in this study, it was established that a cyberterrorist message is a complex
conglomeration of tactics designed to instill fear in their target population, to disrupt the web
functioning of a target, to procure information, as a means to obtain funding, for the purposes of
recruitment, to gain sympathy from others with similar thought patterns, and to look powerful
while doing so.
Additionally, every research question was answered thoroughly. Question one asked how
communicative messages are logistically being carried out. It was established through the data
that messages are being conveyed in a variety of ways. Cyberterrorists lean heavily on
propaganda to get the message across to the public. Being a cyberterrorist partially lies in the
damage and harm that can occur. An even bigger piece of the equation is the theatrical aspects
that overlap with the damage. A heavy emphasis is placed on the notoriety of these criminals to
meet a list of goals. These goals include instilling fear, carving a name for oneself, alluding
authority, flaunting accepted protocol or behavior, and recruiting others to join the cause that
they have already embarked on. If the cyberterrorist can get into the psyche of the public and
cause fear and doubt in the government to protect them, then they have succeeded in ways that
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meet or even surpass the physical damage that can occur. The propaganda of websites, posted
videos, forums, blog posts, and email encryptions allow for these goals to be met.
Having established a foundation for how these goals are being carried out, there is the
question of how outside participation of the media affects the cyberterrorist outcomes. The data
revealed that the media implications lie deeper than surface level reporting and actually had
adverse consequences for those fighting cyberterrorism. The data suggested that the media
implications include damages to the psyche of the public due to over-exaggeration in reporting
and tipping off cybercriminals to progress made by law enforcement. The most damaging
consequence is allowing the goals of the cyberterrorist to be met. When this occurs, the media
has additionally allowed the cyberterrorists to gain a more powerful symbolic and detrimentally
psychological foothold to continue with the missions that they have embarked on.
The third and fourth research questions deal with the bigger picture, or the global
implications as defined by Stamper’s Semiotic Ladder. It has been stated time and again that
cyberterrorism spans borders and boundaries both literally and figuratively. Documented cases
have occurred not only in the parts of the United States, such as Atlanta, New York City, San
Jose, and Massachusetts, but internationally as well, in countries such as Estonia, Russia,
Australia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Morocco. The third question inquires about what aspects of the
social world are being met. Because this is the aspect that deals heavily in the beliefs and the
culture that can result from a given symbolic action, it is important to recognize that there are
naturally going to be many different opinions that form from that act. Based on the small amount
of places listed above, it stands to reason that each geographical area is replete with different
political and religious viewpoints, worldviews, customs, and beliefs on “dealing with the
enemy.” The social world aspect (i.e., beliefs, customs, worldviews, etc.) can be witnessed in the
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propaganda set forth by cyberterrorists, being displayed on websites, forums, emails, and video
posts. The example given before, with Irhabi007’s messages of: “The enemies of Allah will
continuously [try to close down] our website....” is a symbolic indicator strictly from language
alone. A person with a worldview that these cyberterrorist crimes should be stopped would
certainly not consider him- or herself an enemy to God. Clearly, the poster of this message
disagrees, calling those whose job is to protect the targets from harm an “enemy.”
The fourth research question expands upon this concept by asking how the social world
aspects are being carried out. Again, the data delve into the logistical side of the equation by
analyzing the aspects that make this method of crime a postmodern attack. Because of the
technologically elevated aspect of the tools, there are a greater number of people who can be
exposed to the various beliefs on the subject of cyberterrorism. Historically, when a terrorist
wanted to post demands or brag about misdeeds that were committed, the channels that they had
to go through included the media and governmental agents representing those who had been
attacked. Presently, the notion that one website alone can generate thousands upon thousands of
hits has greater repercussions now than they did in the past when the communicative messages of
the terrorist were posted at the behest of the media. The new form of technology bypasses the
intermediary and puts the control in the hands of the cyberterrorist who no longer has to wait for
another to comply with their wishes for publicity.
The means of a cyberterrorist to communicate their messages is done through a variety of
ways including email, virus spreading, websites, and video posts. These means are all done
through the use of a computer and have been found to adversely affect targets that are exposed to
these means of propaganda and publicity only to be left fearful and with less faith in their
government’s ability to protect them. Another component of the cyberterrorist, target equation is
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that of the media and their ability to either influence the emotional responses of targets or as a
compromising influence on the investigation of cyberterrorist matters. The media was found to
be a negative influence from the perspective of placing cyberterrorism as a crime. Lastly, there is
the actual focus on cyberterrorist messages as a communicative process. Stamper’s Semiotic
Ladder, once again, was helpful in illustrating, from first level, to sixth, the various ways in
which an entity could be taken and manipulated to symbolically represent something else. In this
case, bits of metal and plastic (computer) became a weapon. That weapon took letters and
numbers and words and gave them power (threatening messages). Those threats were written as
data, infused as information and displayed on a screen (website). That website was sponsored
and added to and built upon until the content became more than words and numbers on a screen,
but a moving image of a crime that has been committed (video post of attacks or hostages).
Those video posts became symbols of power from a group of people, an organization that does
not follow the rules and protocol assumed by humanity. That power grew and continues to grow
stronger and more salient due to the nature of the beast. These are crimes committed by the
nameless and the faceless. Keen (1991) suggested that the nameless and the faceless who
produce the propaganda will never grow to be anything more than ”us” versus “them,” a tactic
that takes the human out of the equation.
From Stamper’s Semiotic Ladder, it has been established that what is most human, the
interpretation, the beliefs, the culture that forms thereafter, cannot be subjected to the process of
being dehumanized. When there is an enemy that is nameless, faceless, and who instills fear in a
population, then the propaganda that is put forth only becomes more powerful and more
symbolic of that harm that could occur at the hands of that enemy. Law enforcement, FBI, and
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cyber forensic experts must work together to find common ground so that the power and control
already established by cyberterrorism can be diminished, with the power become enervated.
As I gathered all the data and analyze them in depth, my ultimate goal was to
demonstrate and provide concrete examples that cyberterrorists’ communicative messages, their
styles of propaganda, and their various tactics constitute a semiotic gesture. As the literature
review has shown, cyberterrorists seek publicity; they advertize their deeds and intents. Yet,
through further research and interviews with participants, there has been a specific focus on the
actual effects of their semiotic messages on targets, on the public, and on the world at large. By
providing better increasing awareness of cyberterrorist propaganda, it is hoped that this study not
only opened the eyes of readers as to what may happen to their own personal computers; but also
gave fresh insights to the participants themselves – that is, law enforcement agents – and their
colleagues all over the world as to how to better their counter-terrorism strategies, both online
and offline.

Limitations

When conducting this study, several unforeseen or unexpected limitations were found.
The limitations unfolded in a sequence that seemed to expand upon itself. The most prevalent
source of limitation occurred while trying to find participants to interview. In many cases, six to
be exact, the participants were very willing to be interviewed but upon learning what these
questions were asking, some participants were simply not versed in the subject of
“cyberterrorism.” There were instances in which interviews were terminated mid-way through
because the participant felt that they could not provide enough material to do the topic justice.
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The lack of answers from these people combined with the cases of those who do have a
background in cyberterrorism, I found, could be attributed to a combination of both the nature of
the material being very specific or the jurisdiction of the participants and what they were willing
or able to reveal.
It was noted earlier that this study was qualitative primarily because of the sensitive
nature of the material and need for trust between participant and interviewer. Face-to-face
interviewing provided an opportunity to build upon that trust, but only to a certain extent. The
nature of this material is very sensitive not only to the psyche of participants but also in matters
of security. Because I conducted interviews with members of the FBI as well as cyber forensic
experts, a few of my questions were met with hesitations by the participants prior to my
receiving an answer. In some ways, I feel this may have inhibited the participants, not because
they lacked trust in me but because there was a need to know to what extent the data were going
to be used. Additionally, because these answers were taken from the viewpoint of those who try
to stop cyberterrorism, the perspective that was given is not the same had actual cyberterrorists
been interviewed.
An additional limitation concerned the researcher herself, that is, me being a
communication scholar. To begin with, I did not have a strong background in cyber law and
conflict studies. This was an obstacle because, prior to every interview, additional research
needed to be conducted so that I would have a general idea about the jargon that could
potentially have been mentioned. Because I was interviewing people in a field they felt
comfortable in, and to which their vernacular consisted heavily of field related jargon, I was
forced to ask for clarification in more than one instance on abbreviations or terms. All
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participants assisted in clarification but I cannot be sure that the impressions that I had built as a
credible and knowledgeable researcher were permanent after asking for clarification.
Lastly, a major but practical limitation that occurred was the lack of time and resources
available in this study. My participants were located in various places across the country. As
mentioned earlier, there were a few interviews that occurred via the telephone and, while I do not
think that the nature of the data collected was any better or worse for having been conducted
remotely, I do think it would have been ideal to have the time and resources to go and see the
participants in the same face to face settings that occurred during the local interviews.

Future Directions

As with any study, there are limitless possibilities for future research. Many aspects
pertaining to cyberterrorism have been discussed in this qualitative research study with still more
answers to be uncovered. One of the main aspects for future research would be to take the
premise of communicative messages and talk to cyberterrorists to find out what perspective they
follow. There has not been a lot of ample opportunity to study the type of people who fit the
profile for cyberterrorists. If research were conducted by talking to actual cyberterrorists, or even
hacker organizations to start, a profile for these criminals could start to be established. This
would provide an opportunity to gain exact information about motivations and intent for any
communication whether it be through email, website, or video posting.
Another possibility for future research would be to take the perspective of the media. One
could potentially ascertain the rationale for what they chose to report on and why. This direct
assessment of the media could possibly allow for answers to emerge that would work toward
76

being one step closer to better working relations between law enforcement and the media with
the intention of bettering the output to the public. Additionally, the media perspective would
allow for a better understanding and clarification of more consequences that occur from the
media broadcasts that inadvertently enhance the cause of the cyberterrorists, rather than work
toward a safer outcome for the public.
Cyberterrorism could also be looked at from the scope of organized crime. Theory
suggests that the main motive behind organized crime is to gain a profit. Though not all motives
of cyberterrorism are profit-centered, there are, as this study suggests, aspects that focus on the
financial downfall of others. Research could be done to study how the networks function
systemically or how they fit into a pattern of traditional organized crime. A comparative analysis
could be done using an organizational model that would fit traditional groups such as the mafia
and test to see if cyberterrorism falls into a similar category.
Throughout this study, a lot of time and research were devoted to the notion of citizens
and civilians being fearful of attack based on cyberterrorist propaganda as well as having faulty
trust in the government’s ability to protect them. One potential study that would be quantifiable
could be to gather research from everyday citizens without a formal understanding or
background in cyberterrorism and gauge their reactions to propaganda put out by cyberterrorists.
This could be done through a manner of methods, such as showing them videos posted by
cyberterrorists, or setting up scenarios of cyberterrorist attacks such as denial of service attacks
that have already been documented to ascertain whether or not, or how intensely they were
affected by what they witnessed.
There was one theme consistently brought up during the interviews: the similarities
between what is previously considered terrorism (the brick and mortar establishments, the
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suicide bombers who actually strapped bombs to themselves in order to cause destruction and
death) and that of cyberterrorism. At this point, there has been extensive research done on
preventative measures for traditional terrorism. Research can pinpoint different aspects of both
historical and cyberterrorism to access pros and cons of each, as well as looking at the overlap to
see if there are any additional preventative measures that can be taken to increase protection for
the public in the case of cyberterrorism.
Another theme that was brought up but not elaborated on in this study was the novelty of
cyberterrorism in law enforcement and the problem of information sharing. While conducting
interviews, I heard a lot from participants that information sharing was typically a battle
constantly being fought. Because this is such a new area for many law enforcement officials, the
potential for failure of coordination among agencies is colossal. Coordination between
jurisdictions is greatly needed not only for cooperation but also for pooling of funding for
education and training as well as prevention strategies. As a last suggestion, research could be
conducted that addresses all of these concerns to further the protective efforts of every branch of
law enforcement.
Truly, it is the researcher’s hope that this qualitative study has enlightened not only those
who participated in the study but those who are in a position to build upon the knowledge.
Ultimately, an ideal outcome would be for all branches of government, from law enforcement to
FBI, to work on bettering communication with each other, as one group. With attention and
diligence, there can be positive efforts to transform cyberterrorism from symbolically powerful
to virtually insignificant.
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1) What is a cyberterrorist?

2) How do you recognize cyberterrorism?

3) What are cyberterrorist messages?

4) What sorts of publicity or propaganda do cyberterrorists use?

5) Who are the potential targets of cyberterrorists?

6) What kind of strategies do cyberterrorists use to communicate their intent(s)?

7) What are the effects of cyberterrorism on targets?

8) Who are the targets of cyberterrorism?

9) How do cyberterrorists feel about cyberterrorism?

10) Is there anything else you want to add that I should know?
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PROJECT TITLE:
Cyberterrorists: Their Communicative Intents and Their Effects on Targets
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR:
Elizabeth Minei
CONTACT INFORMATION:
(561) 721-5271
I am a UCF Master’s student at the Nicholson School of Communication at the University of Central Florida and I am working
under the supervision of Dr. Jonathan Matusitz. You are being asked to volunteer for a research study. You were selected as a
possible participant because you are a cyber forensics expert or LE (Law Enforcement) agent. Please read this informed consent
form and feel free to ask me any questions that you may have before agreeing to take part in this study.
Purpose of the Study
This study analyzes communicative intents of hackers and how they aim at sending messages of violence designed to publicize
their status of power and legitimacy. The goal is also to investigate the effects of the violent attacks and/or messages of
cyberterrorists on targets, and who the targets are.
Methods and Procedures
The method used in this study is interviewing lasting one hour, where you will be asked questions pertaining to the topic. This
study has minimal or no risks involved. There are no direct benefits to participating, there is no penalty for not participating, and
there is no compensation for participating. You do not need to answer any question that you wish to answer. You may also
withdraw from my study at any time.
You must be 18 years of age or older to participate.
To assist with accurate recording of participant responses, interviews may be recorded on an audio recording device/video
recording device. The tapes will be transcribed following the interview, then immediately destroyed. Participants have the right to
refuse to allow such taping without penalty.
Any records of this study will be kept private. The consent forms will be stored separately from the interviews and other study
materials. In published reports, there will be no information included that will make it possible to identify the research
participant. Research records will be stored securely, for three years, in a computer file or in a safe box. I will store the data on
my computer and keep these transcriptions safe by locking them into a program file that can only be opened with a password.
Your name will NOT be mentioned.
Contacts and Questions
The researcher(s) conducting this study can be contacted at (561) 721-5271 or minei33@gmail.com (for Elizabeth Minei, the
principal investigator) and (407) 531-5459 or jmatusit@mail.ucf.edu (for Dr. Jonathan Matusitz, the faculty sponsor). You are
encouraged to contact the researcher(s) if you have any questions.
Research at the University of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of the Institutional
Review Board. Questions or concerns about research participants' rights may be directed to the UCF IRB office, University of
Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246, or by
campus mail 32816-0150. The hours of operation are 8:00 am until 5:00 pm, Monday through Friday except on University of
Central Florida official holidays. The telephone numbers are (407) 882-2276 and (407) 823-2901.
I hereby agree to the terms stipulated in this informed consent form
0 I consent to the use of audio recording.
0 I do not consent to the use of audio recording.
Participant’s Name: __________________________

Date: _________________
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